4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
Full Idea: I shall say 'games' form a family, with a 'family resemblance', for the resemblances within a family - build, eyes, temperament etc. - overlap and criss-cross in the same way. | |
From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §067) | |
A reaction: A very helpful idea for the nominalist view of universals, particularly for showing how concepts shade off indeterminately at the edges. |
3176 | Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one [Rey] |
Full Idea: Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 4.3) |
21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
Full Idea: 'Blue' is vague by some standards, for it has borderline cases, but that does not make it a family resemblance term, for all the shades of blue resemble each other in some respect. | |
From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 3.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably the point of family resemblance is that fringe members as still linked to the family, despite having lost the main features. A bit of essentialism seems needed here. |
22336 | We might say that the family resemblance is just a consequence of meaning-as-use [Glock] |
Full Idea: Against Wittgenstein's family resemblance view one might evoke his own idea that the meaning of a word is its use, and that diversity of use entails diversity of meaning. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Wittgenstein might just accept the point. Diversity of concepts reflects diversity of usage. But how do you distinguish 'football is a game' from 'oy, what's your game?'. How does usage distinguish metaphorical from literal (if it does)? |
22335 | The variety of uses of 'game' may be that it has several meanings, and isn't a single concept [Glock] |
Full Idea: The proper conclusion to draw from the fact that we explain 'game' in a variety of different ways is that it is not a univocal term, but has different, albeit related, meanings. | |
From: Hans-Johann Glock (What is Analytic Philosophy? [2008], 8.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Rundle 1990] Potter says Wittgenstein insisted that 'game' is a single concept. 'Game' certainly slides off into metaphor, as in 'are you playing games with me?'. The multivocal view would still meet family resemblance on a narrower range. |