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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

[type of series formed by events in time]

13 ideas
The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: McTaggart says the A-series is more fundamental than the B-series. An objective being could not deduce the present moment of the A-series from the B-series, but the B-series can be deduced from the A-series.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 08 'McTaggart's'
     A reaction: [summarised] This has no ontological importance for McTaggart, since he thinks time is unreal either way. But giving the A-series priority because it reveals the present moment seems to nullify the B-series as incomplete.
A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
     Full Idea: The A-series puts events into past, present and future. The B-series puts events into a series based on relationships of 'before' and 'after'. McTaggart said the A-series was contradictory, and the B-series failed to cope with essential features of time.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927]) by Rod Girle - Modal Logics and Philosophy 8.10
     A reaction: The A-series is indexical.
A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: A-series expressions include words like 'today' and 'five weeks ago', and can be true at one time and false at another; B-series expressions are like 'simultaneously', and are always true, if true at all.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927]) by E.J. Lowe - A Survey of Metaphysics p.308
     A reaction: A-series gives time separate existence, where B-series time is purely relational. Intuition favours the A-series, but how fast do events travel against this fixed background?
The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: McTaggart's argument is 1) B-series relations are temporal relations, 2) There cannot be temporal relations unless there is change, 3) There cannot be change unless there is real A-series ordering, so there can't be a B-series unless there is an A-series.
     From: report of J.M.E. McTaggart (The Nature of Existence vol.2 [1927], vol.ii) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 1 a
We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]
     Full Idea: We imagine presentness moving, like the spot of light from a policeman's bulls eye traversing the fronts of houses in a street. What is illuminated is present, what was illuminated is past, and what is not yet illuminated is the future.
     From: C.D. Broad (Scientific Thought [1923], II)
     A reaction: This is the 'moving spotlight' compromise theory, which retains the B-series eternal sequence of ordered events, but adds the A-series privileged present moment. Le Poidevin says Broad represents time twice over.
A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
     A reaction: The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?
Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: Events and objects that have ceased to exist change their A-series position (by becoming increasingly past), but persisting objects, in contrast, change their present B-series position.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' [1998], 1 n2)
     A reaction: The second half seems to imply a 'moving spotlight' of the present. This distinction is important, as it creates problems for all theories. The asymmetry seems weird.
In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin]
     Full Idea: The crucial distinction is that in the B-series positions in time are unchanging. Positions in the A-series, in contrast, do change: what is now present was once future and will be past.
     From: Robin Le Poidevin (Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense [1998], 1 (a))
     A reaction: So does A-series time consist of a property which things gain and then lose, or a location which things enter and then leave? Neither analogy seems to throw much light.
The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM]
     Full Idea: Three theories exhaust the options on time: presentism, dynamic eternalism (eternalism with the tensed dynamic A-series view of time, and the totality of events changing over time), and static eternalism (eternalism with the B-series).
     From: Thomas M. Crisp (Presentism [2003], 2.4)
     A reaction: I think the idea that reality is Static Eternalism is just a misunderstanding, arising from our imaginative ability to take a lofty objective overview of a very fluid reality. The other two are the serious candidates. Present, or Growing-block.
Time is tensed or tenseless; the latter says all times and objects are real, and there is no passage of time [Bourne]
     Full Idea: Theories of time are in two broad categories, the tenseless and the tensed theories. In tenseless theories, all times are equally real, as are all objects located at them, and there is no passage of time from future to present to past. It's the B-series.
     From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIa)
     A reaction: It might solve a few of the problems, but is highly counterintuitive. Presumably it makes the passage of time an illusion, and gives no account of how events 'happen', or of their direction, and it leaves causation out on a limb. I'm afraid not.
B-series objects relate to each other; A-series objects relate to the present [Bourne]
     Full Idea: Objects in the B-series are earlier than, later than, or simultaneous with each other, whereas objects in the A-series are earlier than, later than or simultaneous with the present.
     From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], Intro IIb)
     A reaction: Must we choose? Two past events relate to each other, but there is a further relation when 'now' falls between the events. If I must choose, I suppose I go for the A-series view. The B-series is a subsequent feat of imagination. McTaggart agreed.
The present moment, time's direction, and time's dynamic quality seem to be objective facts [Price,H]
     Full Idea: The flow of time seems to be an objective feature of reality because of 1) the present moment can be objectively distinguished, 2) time has an objective direction, of earlier and later, and 3) there is something objectively dynamic about time.
     From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 1.1)
     A reaction: Price sets out to undermine all three of these claims, in implicit defence of a psychological view. I disagree with him.
The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction [Baron/Miller]
     Full Idea: The C-series sees times not as directed, but as unchanging, and ordered in terms of the betweenness relation. The C-theory also asserts that the A-series and B-series do not exist.
     From: Baron,S/Miller,K (Intro to the Philosophy of Time [2019], 1.2)
     A reaction: This is McTaggart's idea. Compare this with A-series ordering by past, present and future, and B-series ordering by earlier-than, later-than and simultaneous. The main point is that A and B have a direction, but C does not.