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27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion

[understanding motion in relation to time]

4 ideas

22943	Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: Being in motion at a particular time can be an intrinsic property of an object, as a disposition to be elsewhere than the place it is.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'in present')
	A reaction: This needs an ontology which includes unrealised dispositions. People trapped in boring meetings have a disposition to be elsewhere, but they are stuck. I think 'power' is a better word here than 'disposition'. The disposition isn't just for 'elsewhere'.

22945	The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
	Full Idea: According to the dynamic account of motion, an object's being in motion is a primitive event, not further analysable in terms of objects, properties and times.
	From: Robin Le Poidevin (Travels in Four Dimensions [2003], 09 'Zeno')
	A reaction: [The rival view is 'static'] Physics suggests that motion may be indefinable, but acceleration can be given a reductive account. If time and space are taken as primitive (which seems sensible to me), then making motion also primitive is a bit greedy.

22884	The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon]
	Full Idea: Whether or not something is in motion should be a fact about that thing now, not a fact about the thing in its past or in its future.
	From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 1 'Arrow')
	A reaction: This is one of the present moment, in which nothing can occur if its magnitude is infinitely small. I have no solution to this problem.

22892	Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon]
	Full Idea: Experience itself may be constituted by overlapping, very brief, but temporally extended, acts of awareness, each of which encompassesa temporally extended streeeeetch of perceived events.
	From: Adrian Bardon (Brief History of the Philosophy of Time [2013], 2 'Realism')
	A reaction: [cites Barry Dainton 2000] I think this sounds better than Russell's suggestion, though along the same lines. I take all brain events to be a sort of memory, briefly retaining their experience. Very fast events blur because of overload.