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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason

[reasoning processes that lead to action]

21 ideas
For Socrates, wisdom and prudence were the same thing [Socrates, by Xenophon]
Seeing particulars as parts of larger wholes is to perceive their value [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
We deliberate about means, not ends [Aristotle]
Practical intellect serves to arrive at the truth which corresponds to right appetite [Aristotle]
Prudence is mainly concerned with particulars, which is the sphere of human conduct [Aristotle]
Virtue ensures that we have correct aims, and prudence that we have correct means of achieving them [Aristotle]
One cannot be prudent without being good [Aristotle]
The one virtue of prudence carries with it the possession of all the other virtues [Aristotle]
Practical reason is truth-attaining, and focused on actions good for human beings [Aristotle]
Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus]
Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes]
We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz]
For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham]
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant]
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant]
If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer]
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor]
'Phronesis' should translate as 'practical intelligence', not as prudence [Annas]