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16. Persons / E. Self as Mind / 4. Associated Self

[Self is a unity formed by associating mental events]

17 ideas
Associations are too loose and fading to fix identity, so it is just a linguistic problem [PG on Hume]
The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume]
Personal identity is built up through resemblance and causation [PG on Hume]
Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume]
Resemblance forms continuous mental links, so it must be the basis of our identity [PG on Hume]
Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume]
My theory that the self is associations won't work; we never see the associations [PG on Hume]
Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer]
Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer]
Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]
If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer]
Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle]
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Maslin on Parfit]
Can the mental elements of a 'bundle' exist on their own? [Carruthers]
Why would a thought be a member of one bundle rather than another? [Carruthers]