6214
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Liberty and necessity are consistent, as when water freely flows, by necessity
[Hobbes]
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Full Idea:
Liberty and necessity are consistent: as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel.
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From:
Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], II.Ch.XI)
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A reaction:
Hume asserts something similar (Idea 2223), but they both miss the point, which is that libertarians about water would have to believe it didn't need to follow gravity, but could refuse to flow. Freedom of will and freedom of action are quite different.
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12492
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Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills
[Locke]
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Full Idea:
Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.14)
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A reaction:
He is suggesting the 'free will' is a category mistake, but why shouldn't a power have a power? Magnetism can be strong, or focused. He is ducking the question of what ultimately controls the will.
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12493
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A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences
[Locke]
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Full Idea:
So far as his power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free. ..We can scarcely imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills.
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From:
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.21)
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A reaction:
It take this approach, which Hume echoes, to be ducking the metaphysical problem, of where the act of willing originates. Locke goes on to admit this.
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19368
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The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it
[Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Choice, however much the will is determined to make it, should not be called absolutely and strictly necessary: a predominance of goods of which one is aware inclines without necessitating, though this is determining and never fails to have its effect.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21)
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A reaction:
Something like seeing that 7+5 equals 12 makes you say '12', but it doesn't actually necessitate your saying '12'? Certain facts seem determined by nature, but not necessitated. Or not necessarily necessitated?
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5031
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Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe
[Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
It is not the case that everything which happens is necessary; rather, everything which happens is certain after God made choice of this possible universe, whose notion contains this series of things.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05)
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A reaction:
I think this distinction is best captured as 'metaphysical necessity' (Leibniz's 'necessity'), and 'natural necessity' (his 'certainty'). 'Certainty' seems a bad word, as it is either certain de dicto or de re. Is God certain, or is the thing certain?
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15617
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In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together
[Hegel]
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Full Idea:
Considered as abstractly confronting one another, freedom and necessity pertain to finitude only and are valid only on its soil. A freedom with no necessity in it, and a mere necessity without freedom, are determinations that are abstract and thus untrue.
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From:
Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §35 Add)
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A reaction:
This is, presumably, the Hegelian dialectical nature of things, that contradictories are bound together. We must struggle hard to undestand a freedom bound by necessity, and a necessity which contains freedom. (Good luck).
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6149
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Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice
[Merricks]
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Full Idea:
The main recent support for incompatibilism is the 'no choice' argument: we have no choice that the past and the laws of nature entail human actions, we have no choice about what the past or the laws are like, so we have no choice about our actions.
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From:
Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §6.III)
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A reaction:
Since I consider free will to be an absurd chimera, I think this argument involves a total misunderstanding of what a 'choice' is. Since the human brain is a wonderfully sophisticated choosing machine, our whole life consists of choices.
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