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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism

[free will is possible in a deterministic worlc]

12 ideas
We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: The best men have no belief in necessity (set up by some as mistress of all), but refer some things to fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is irresponsible, and fortune is unstable, while our own will is free.
     From: Epicurus (Letter to Menoeceus [c.291 BCE], 133), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.27
Destiny is only a predisposing cause, not a sufficient cause [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus considered destiny to be not a cause sufficient of itself but only a predisposing cause.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE], fr 997) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1056b
     A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of determinism, and is the equivalent of Epicurus' introduction of the 'swerve' in atoms. They had suddenly become bothered about the free will problem in about 305 BCE. There must be other non-destiny causes?
Liberty and necessity are consistent, as when water freely flows, by necessity [Hobbes]
     Full Idea: Liberty and necessity are consistent: as in the water, that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel.
     From: Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan [1651], II.Ch.XI)
     A reaction: Hume asserts something similar (Idea 2223), but they both miss the point, which is that libertarians about water would have to believe it didn't need to follow gravity, but could refuse to flow. Freedom of will and freedom of action are quite different.
Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke]
     Full Idea: Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.14)
     A reaction: He is suggesting the 'free will' is a category mistake, but why shouldn't a power have a power? Magnetism can be strong, or focused. He is ducking the question of what ultimately controls the will.
A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke]
     Full Idea: So far as his power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free. ..We can scarcely imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.21)
     A reaction: It take this approach, which Hume echoes, to be ducking the metaphysical problem, of where the act of willing originates. Locke goes on to admit this.
The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Choice, however much the will is determined to make it, should not be called absolutely and strictly necessary: a predominance of goods of which one is aware inclines without necessitating, though this is determining and never fails to have its effect.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 2.21)
     A reaction: Something like seeing that 7+5 equals 12 makes you say '12', but it doesn't actually necessitate your saying '12'? Certain facts seem determined by nature, but not necessitated. Or not necessarily necessitated?
Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: It is not the case that everything which happens is necessary; rather, everything which happens is certain after God made choice of this possible universe, whose notion contains this series of things.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Antoine Arnauld [1686], 1686.05)
     A reaction: I think this distinction is best captured as 'metaphysical necessity' (Leibniz's 'necessity'), and 'natural necessity' (his 'certainty'). 'Certainty' seems a bad word, as it is either certain de dicto or de re. Is God certain, or is the thing certain?
Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume]
     Full Idea: By liberty we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will, …which is universally allowed to everyone who is not a prisoner and in chains.
     From: David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VIII.I.73)
Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume]
     Full Idea: Hume's account of the causal relation makes determinism less rigid because there is no longer a logical necessity in the succession of events.
     From: comment on David Hume (Enquiry Conc Human Understanding [1748], VIII.II.75) by Jennifer Trusted - Free Will and Responsibility Ch.4
In abstraction, beyond finitude, freedom and necessity must exist together [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Considered as abstractly confronting one another, freedom and necessity pertain to finitude only and are valid only on its soil. A freedom with no necessity in it, and a mere necessity without freedom, are determinations that are abstract and thus untrue.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §35 Add)
     A reaction: This is, presumably, the Hegelian dialectical nature of things, that contradictories are bound together. We must struggle hard to undestand a freedom bound by necessity, and a necessity which contains freedom. (Good luck).
Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson]
     Full Idea: I find compelling Peter van Ingwagen's argument that because the past is outside our control, and any action fully determined by something outside our control is not free, determinism is inconsistent with free will.
     From: report of Peter van Inwagen (An Essay on Free Will [1983]) by Frank Jackson - From Metaphysics to Ethics Ch.2
     A reaction: I am puzzled by anyone who even dreamt that full blown free will (very free indeed) could be compatible with the view that past events impose a necessity on future events. So called 'compatibilists' strike me as being determinists.
Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice [Merricks]
     Full Idea: The main recent support for incompatibilism is the 'no choice' argument: we have no choice that the past and the laws of nature entail human actions, we have no choice about what the past or the laws are like, so we have no choice about our actions.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Objects and Persons [2003], §6.III)
     A reaction: Since I consider free will to be an absurd chimera, I think this argument involves a total misunderstanding of what a 'choice' is. Since the human brain is a wonderfully sophisticated choosing machine, our whole life consists of choices.