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22. Metaethics / C. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism

[morality is just an expression of feelings]

23 ideas
'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes]
If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant]
People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant]
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell]
Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer]
Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer]
To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer]
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre]
The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre]
Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre]
Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre]
Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg]