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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism

[mind is a causal network of functions]

22 ideas
Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In 'De Anima' Aristotle cannot fit his account of separable reason - which is not the form of a body - into his general theory that the soul is the form of the body.
     From: comment on Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE]) by J.L. Ackrill - Aristotle on Eudaimonia p.33
     A reaction: A penetrating observation. Possibly the biggest challenge for a modern physicalist is to give a reductive account of 'pure' reason, in terms of brain events or brain functions.
Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Perhaps it would be better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does in virtue of the soul.
     From: Aristotle (De Anima [c.329 BCE], 408b12)
     A reaction: This can be seen as incipient behaviourism in Aristotle's view. It echoes the functionalist view that what matters is not what the mind is, or is made of, but what it does.
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
     Full Idea: I propose the hypothesis that pain, or the state of being in pain, is a functional state of a whole organism.
     From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.54)
     A reaction: This sounds wrong right from the start. Pain hurts. The fact that it leads to avoidance behaviour etc. seems much more like a by-product of pain than its essence.
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
     Full Idea: The functional-state hypothesis is not incompatible with dualism, as a system consisting of a body and a soul could meet the required conditions.
     From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.55)
     A reaction: He doesn't really believe this, of course. This claim led to all the weak objections to functionalism involving silly implementations of minds. A brain is the only plausible way to implement our mental functions.
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
     Full Idea: The presence of a certain functional state is not merely 'correlated with' but actually explains the pain behaviour on the part of the organism.
     From: Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States [1968], p.58)
     A reaction: Does it offer any further explanation beyond saying that it is the brain state that causes the behaviour? The pain is just a link between damage and avoidance. I wish that is all that pain was.
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
     Full Idea: Functionalism has been rejuvenated by being joined to externalist causal theories of reference.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 2.VIII)
     A reaction: This, however, seems to be roughly the reason why Putnam gave up his functionalist theory. See Ideas 2332 and 2071. However the causal network of mind can incorporate environmental features.
Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
     Full Idea: There has been much scepticism about a functionalist account of intentionality, particularly from Putnam (recently) and Searle, but, like many others, I don't see any principled objections to such an account.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §4 p.101)
     A reaction: I agree. I don't believe that intentionality is a candidate for being one of those many 'magic' qualities which are supposed to make the reduction of mind to brain impossible.
Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
     Full Idea: Most neurons, it has been said, are pretty much alike and largely interchangeable.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 76)
     A reaction: This fact, if true, is highly significant, because the correct theory of the mind must therefore be some sort of functionalism. If what a neuron is is insignificant, then what it does must be what matters.
Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
     Full Idea: Machine functionalism requires a mental state to be a physical realisation of a Turing machine; causal-theoretical functionalism only requires that there be appropriate "internal states".
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.112)
     A reaction: Searle's objection to the Turing machine version seems good - that such a machine has an implicit notion of a user/interpreter, which is absent from this theory of mind.
Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett]
     Full Idea: How could you make a robot conscious? The answer, I think, is to be found in software.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Brainchildren [1998], Ch.6)
     A reaction: This seems to be a commitment to strong AI, though Dennett is keen to point out that brains are the only plausible implementation of such software. Most find his claim baffling.
In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
     Full Idea: According to functionalism, a system might have the behaviouristic input-output relations, yet not desire something, as this requires internal states with certain causal relations.
     From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 69)
     A reaction: Such a system might be Putnam's 'superactor', who only behaves as if he desires something. Of course, the internal states might need more than just 'causal relations'.
Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
     Full Idea: Functionalism is a new incarnation of behaviourism, replacing sensory inputs with sensory inputs plus mental states, and replacing dispositions to act with dispositions plus certain mental states.
     From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 69)
     A reaction: I think of functionalism as behaviourism which extends inside the 'black box' between stimulus and response. It proposes internal stimuli and responses. Consequently functionalism inherits some behaviourist problems.
You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
     Full Idea: It is hard to see how to make sense of the analog of color spectrum inversion with respect to non-qualitative states such a beliefs (where they are functionally equivalent but have different beliefs).
     From: Ned Block (Troubles with Functionalism [1978], p. 81)
     A reaction: I would suggest that beliefs can be 'inverted', because there are all sorts of ways to implement a belief, but colour can't be inverted, because that depends on a particular brain state. It makes good sense to me...
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
     Full Idea: Functionalists claim that pains and the like are higher-order, relational properties that things have in virtue of the pattern of causal interactions that they (can or do) enter into.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (In a Critical Condition [2000], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: The whole idea of a property being purely 'relational' strikes me as dubious (or even nonsense). "Is north of" is a relation, but it is totally derived from more basical physical geographical properties.
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
     Full Idea: There appear to be qualitative aspects of experience that have no function in the life of the organism. They constitute dysfunction or noise. Blurriness in a visual experience is an example.
     From: Tyler Burge (Philosophy of Mind: 1950-2000 [2005], p.460)
     A reaction: The best account of blurred vision would seem to be adverbial - I see 'in a blurred way' (nay, blurredly). Hence maybe blurred vision is functional, but it just isn't functioning very well.
If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey]
     Full Idea: If many otherwise ordinary people turned out to have skulls which were empty or filled with oatmeal, would that mean that they didn't have minds?
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 7.1.4)
     A reaction: That's a John Locke sort of question, implying that 'persons' are logically independent of their implementation. Personally I would search for a radio receiver, because oatmeal is implausible as a thinker.
Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey]
     Full Idea: Neither dualism nor physicalism provides much serious explanation of any mental phenomena, or even much in the way of a program of research.
     From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], Int.2)
     A reaction: I'm not sure if people who demand an "explanation of mental phenomena" are quite clear about what it is they want. God might just say "Mental phenomena are just brain events from the brain's point of view".
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
     Full Idea: 'Analytical functionalists', who hold that meanings of mental terms are determined by the causal roles associated with them by 'folk psychology', deny themselves appeals to lower levels of functional organisation.
     From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4)
     A reaction: Presumably folk psychology can fit into the kind of empirical methodology favoured by behaviourists, whereas 'lower levels' are going to become rather speculative and unscientific.
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
     Full Idea: The functionalist must find a level of characterisation of mental states that is not so abstract or behaviouristic as to rule out the possibility of inverted spectrum etc., nor so specific and structural as to fall into chauvinism.
     From: William Lycan (Consciousness [1987], 5.4)
     A reaction: If too specific then animals and aliens won't be able to implement the necessary functions; if the theory becomes very behaviouristic, then it loses interest in the possibility of an inverted spectrum. He is certainly right to hunt for a middle ground.
Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil]
     Full Idea: A central tenet of functionalism is that objects can be dispositionally indiscernible but differ qualitatively as much as you please.
     From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 11.3)
     A reaction: This refers to the multiple realisability of functions. Presumably we reconcile essentialism with the functionalist view by saying that dispositions result from combinations of qualities. A unique combination of qualities will necessitate a disposition.
Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
     Full Idea: For functionalism mental states as roles are second-order properties that have to be realised in various ways in first-order physical properties.
     From: Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §3.3)
     A reaction: I take that to be properties-of-properties, as in 'bright red' or 'poignantly beautiful'. I am inclined to think (with Edelman) that mind is a process, not a property.
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
     Full Idea: According to Folk Functionalism, mental states are theoretically defined by Ramsifying on our folk-psychological theory.
     From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 06.2)