| 2683 | Aristotle has a problem fitting his separate reason into the soul, which is said to be the form of the body [Ackrill on Aristotle] |
| 1718 | Does the mind think or pity, or does the whole man do these things? [Aristotle] |
| 2588 | Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam] |
| 2589 | Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam] |
| 2592 | Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam] |
| 3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
| 2324 | Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim] |
| 3379 | Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim] |
| 3388 | Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim] |
| 2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
| 2575 | Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block] |
| 2576 | In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block] |
| 2583 | You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block] |
| 2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
| 8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
| 3186 | If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? [Rey] |
| 3127 | Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research [Rey] |
| 6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
| 6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
| 7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
| 4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
| 18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |