1549 | Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras] |
2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
12739 | If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz] |
5174 | Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley] |
5192 | Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer] |
3931 | Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley] |
6722 | Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley] |
5601 | There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant] |
3583 | External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill] |
18988 | Behind the bare phenomenal facts there is nothing [Wright,Ch] |
23207 | Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
18209 | We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine] |
8199 | The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett] |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
6522 | Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H] |
6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
20963 | A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive... [Sommers,W] |