structure for 'Knowledge Aims'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     expand these ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

[reality is just actual and potential appearances]

28 ideas
Everything that exists consists in being perceived [Protagoras]
My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes]
If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws [Leibniz]
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Ayer on Berkeley]
Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley]
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant]
External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation [Mill]
Behind the bare phenomenal facts there is nothing [Wright,Ch]
Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Grayling on Russell]
Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell]
Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein]
No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Kim on Ayer]
Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer]
Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer]
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
The existence of a universe without sentience or intelligence is an unintelligible fantasy [Dummett]
Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J]
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M]
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century) [Robinson,H]
Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]
If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones]