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17. Mind and Body / E. Physicalism / 1. Physicalism

[mind is entirely physical in composition]

31 ideas
The soul and the body are inseparable, like the imprint in some wax [Aristotle]
The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius]
Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius]
Intellectual and moral states, and even the soul itself, depend on prime matter for their existence [Pasnau on Blasius]
Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes]
Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes]
Mind and body are the same thing, sometimes seen as thought, and sometimes as extension [Spinoza]
Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie]
The seat of the soul is where our inner and outer worlds interpenetrate [Novalis]
Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer]
The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong]
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke]
In physicalism, the psychological depends on the mental, not the other way around [Jackson]
Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis]
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis]
There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett]
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau]
The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity [Papineau]
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything [Robinson,H]
Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane]
Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane]
Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
Identity theory says consciousness is an abstraction: a state, event, process or property [Polger]
Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence]
Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne]