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16. Persons / B. Concept of the Self / 5. Persistence of Self

[problems of the persistence of Self over time]

14 ideas
We call a person the same throughout life, but all their attributes change [Plato]
Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke ,by Martin/Barresi]
How can we care about our past or future without personal identity? [Butler ,by PG]
In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell]
I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C]
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit]
Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit]
We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan]
A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley]
Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]