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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean

[virtues as appropriate route between evils]

26 ideas
Excess and deficiency are equally at fault [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: Excess and deficiency are equally at fault.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], XI.16)
     A reaction: This is the sort of wisdom we admire in Aristotle (and in any sensible person), but it may also be the deepest motto of conservatism, and it is a long way from romantic philosophy, and the clarion call of Nietzsche to greater excitement in life.
Contentment comes from moderation and proportion in life [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
     Full Idea: Contentment [euthumia] comes about for human beings from the moderation of enjoyment and proportion [summetria] in life.
     From: report of Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B191) by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.1.210
     A reaction: This is close to Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean. The majority of ethical ideas attributed to Democritus (presumably by the Epicureans) are thought to be spurious. This idea actually sounds rather stoic.
Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato]
     Full Idea: Something which is composed of two factors which are bad for different purposes and lies midway between them is better than either of the factors.
     From: Plato (Euthydemus [c.379 BCE], 306a)
The arts produce good and beautiful things by preserving the mean [Plato]
     Full Idea: It is by preserving the mean that arts produce everything that is good and beautiful.
     From: Plato (The Statesman [c.356 BCE], 284b)
The mean implies that vices are opposed to one another, not to virtue [Aristotle, by Annas]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of the mean claims that virtues are not the polar opposites of vices, but rather stand between two vices which are opposed.
     From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a13) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.2
     A reaction: I'm not sure about that. If the two extremes of courage are cowardice and recklessness, how are those two opposed to one another?
Virtues are destroyed by the excess and preserved by the mean [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Temperance and courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency and preserved by the mean.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a23)
     A reaction: It sounds as if drifting off into an excess, like binge drinking, is not just having a bad day, but actually 'destroys' the virtue. Presumably it permanently diminishes the good habit.
Aristotle aims at happiness by depressing emotions to a harmless mean [Nietzsche on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Moralities which aim at the promotion of individual 'happiness' do it with recipes to counter the passions….such as the depression of emotions to a harmless mean at which they may be satisfied, the Aristotelianism of morals.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104a24) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Beyond Good and Evil §198
     A reaction: A serious error by Nietzsche, in which he confuses the mean with the virtue of temperance. The mean aims at appropriate emotion, not suppression. Extreme anger might be appropriate. What does Nietzsche think about inappropriate emotions?
The mean is relative to the individual (diet, for example) [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The mean is relative to US (as an average diet is too small for Milo the wrestler).
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106a32)
     A reaction: Does that mean that if I am a dreadful coward, then achieving a tiny bit of courage will enough to qualify me as courageous? Surely there is something absolute (or external) about the required courage?
Skills are only well performed if they observe the mean [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Every science performs its function well only when it observes the mean.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b09)
     A reaction: Hm. Not sure what he has in mind. Most people aspire to perfection in their skills. The mean needs a continuum between two obvious extremes.
One drink a day is moderation, but very drunk once a week could exhibit the mean [Urmson on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of the mean does not require the doctrine of moderation: if I say we should drink lots of alcohol once a week, but you propose a little each day, your view is more in line with moderation, but we can agree on the doctrine of the mean.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b16) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.162
     A reaction: So two people could agree on the doctrine, but end up behaving differently. This is important for virtue theory. In a moral dilemma there might be several right things that could be done.
In most normal situations it is not appropriate to have any feelings at all [Urmson on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In a normal context, if you invite me to dinner the appropriate amount of anger, pity, fear and confidence I should feel is none.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b17) by J.O. Urmson - Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean p.160
     A reaction: Not an objection to Aristotle, but an important point towards clarifying the doctrine of the mean, which is more to do with appropriateness than with having middling feelings.
We must tune our feelings to be right in every way [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We must have feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1106b18)
     A reaction: And you thought feelings were just whatever comes naturally! We sometimes talk now of 'emotional intellgence', but we should talk more of 'educated emotions'.
The mean is always right, and the extremes are always wrong [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: In all things the mean is to be commended, while the extremes are neither commendable nor right, but reprehensible.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1108a16)
     A reaction: This is the aspect of Aristotle which Nietzsche hated, as a stultifying conservativism seems to be implied. Elsewhere, though, Aristotle emphasises what is 'appropriate' (e.g. in anger) which allows the possibility of bolder and more exciting actions.
The vices to which we are most strongly pulled are most opposed to the mean [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is the things towards which we have the stronger natural inclination that seem to us more opposed to the mean….(e.g. pleasure).
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1109a12)
     A reaction: Trying to identify these might lead to a circularity (if strong opposition can only be identified by strong pull). If the pull varies with individuals, that implies that the opposition is also relative.
To make one's anger exactly appropriate to a situation is very difficult [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is easy to get angry - anyone can do that - but to feel or act towards the right person to the right extent at the right time for the right reason in the right way - that is not easy, and it is not everyone that can do it.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1109a26)
     A reaction: This shows clearly that Aristotle's doctrine of the mean is NOT the same as the virtue of temperance (as Nietzsche seemed to think). Appropriate anger could be very forceful indeed, and bravery might be quite extreme in a particular crisis.
Patient people are indignant, but only appropriately, as their reason prescribes [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Patience is commended, because a patient person tends to be unperturbed and not carried away by his feelings, but indignant only in the way and on the grounds and for the length of time that his 'logos' prescribes.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1125b33)
     A reaction: Because the word 'logos' is used here, this strikes me as Aristotle's best statement of his doctrine of the mean (which is never the middle way, but always the appropriate way).
The sincere man is praiseworthy, because truth is the mean between boasting and irony [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Falsehood is bad and reprehensible, while the truth is a fine and praiseworthy thing; accordingly the sincere man, who hold the mean position, is praiseworthy, while both the deceivers (the boaster and the ironist) are to be censured.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1127a29)
     A reaction: An interesting and surprising claim - that truth is not an abstract Platonic absolute, but a human virtue seen as a mean between two extremes of falsehood (excessive assertion and excessive denial). Truth is a human value.
People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The mean is more contrary to the extremes than the extremes are to each other, because it does not occur with either of them, whereas the extremes often occur with each other. People can be rash cowards, or wasteful in some things and generous in others.
     From: Aristotle (Eudemian Ethics [c.333 BCE], 1234a33)
     A reaction: This rather undermines the neat visual metaphor of a sliding scale, but gives a more accurate account of the mean. The diagram needs three dimensions, instead of two.
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The law is the mean.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1287b04)
     A reaction: He probably intends to say that the law should be the mean. Since virtue is always the mean (i.e. what is appropriate), then it is almost tautological (for him) that the law is the mean.
One of Zeno's books was 'That Which is Appropriate' [Zeno of Citium, by Long]
     Full Idea: Zeno of Citium wrote a (lost) book entitled 'That Which is Appropriate'.
     From: report of Zeno (Citium) (fragments/reports [c.294 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.1
     A reaction: I cite this because I take it to be about what in Aristotle called 'the mean' - to emphasise that the mean is not what is average, or midway between the extremes, but what is a balanced response to each situation
The chief good is indifference to what lies midway between virtue and vice [Ariston, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The chief good is to live in perfect indifference to all those things which are of an intermediate character between virtue and vice.
     From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.2.1
An appropriate action is one that can be defended, perhaps by its consistency. [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: An appropriate action, say the stoics, is that which, when done, admits of a reasonable defence, such as what is consistent in life, and this extends also to plants and animals.
     From: report of Stoic school (fragments/reports [c.200 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.107
     A reaction: I love [Zeno's] word 'appropriate' here, since that strikes me as greatly clarifying the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean. In fact I love the whole of this idea. Appropriate actions can be defended. Cf T.Scanlon. Consistency is a good defence.
Galen's medicine followed the mean; each illness was balanced by opposite treatment [Galen, by Hacking]
     Full Idea: Galen ran medicine on the principle of the mean; afflictions must be treated by contraries; hot diseases deserve cold medicine and moist illnesses want drying agents. (Paracelsus rebelled, treating through similarity).
     From: report of Galen (On Medical Experience [c.169]) by Ian Hacking - The Emergence of Probability Ch.5
     A reaction: This must be inherited from Aristotle, with the aim of virtue for the body, as Aristotle wanted virtue for the psuché. In some areas Galen is probably right, that natural balance is the aim, as in bodily temperature control.
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant]
     Full Idea: Who will specify for me this mean between the two extremes? What distinguishes avarice (as a vice) from thrift (as a virtue) is not that avarice carries thift too far but that avarice has an entirely different principle (maxim).
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 404n Intro XIII)
     A reaction: He says one concerns enjoyment of possessions, and the other their mere possession. Similarly, reckless courage may aim at glory, while cowardice aims at survival. Aristotle is looking at circumstances, Kant at mental states.
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant]
     Full Idea: If the mean between prodigality and avarice is supposed to be one of degree, then one vice would pass over into the opposite vice only through the virtue. So virtue would simply be a diminished, or rather a vanishing vice.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 432 I.I)
     A reaction: Interesting, but not convincing. Doesn't the thought equally show that vice is a vanishing virtue? Aristotle gives the example of the quantity of food we eat, which obviously passes from starvation to appropriate diet to gluttony.
The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The instinct of the herd considers the middle and the mean as the highest and most valuable: the place where the majority finds itself.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §280)
     A reaction: The reason, I think, for Nietzsche's hostility to Aristotle. But the doctrine of the mean doesn't just seek the middle. It seeks what is appropriate. The mean for bravery and cowardice is not somewhat timid bravery; it is alarmingly brave, but sensible.