| 2348 | Is there just one computational state for each specific belief? [Putnam] |
| 2332 | Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic [Putnam] |
| 2071 | If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology [Putnam] |
| 3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
| 3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
| 3393 | How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim] |
| 2578 | Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block] |
| 2585 | Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block] |
| 2586 | In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 7870 | Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role [Papineau] |
| 3206 | One computer program could either play chess or fight a war [Rey] |
| 2418 | The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside [Chalmers] |
| 7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
| 4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
| 6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
| 6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
| 6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |