| 1544 | Perception must be an internal matter, because we can fail to perceive when we are preoccupied [Diogenes of Apollonia, by Theophrastus] |
| 5220 | Particular facts (such as 'is it cooked?') are matters of sense-perception, not deliberation [Aristotle] |
| 12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke] |
| 13005 | Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities [Leibniz] |
| 23454 | Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant] |
| 23231 | I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte] |
| 6935 | In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach] |
| 16859 | Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference [Mill] |
| 18309 | The evidence of the senses is falsified by reason [Nietzsche] |
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| 15248 | Inference in perception is unconvincingly defended as non-conscious and almost instantaneous [Harré/Madden] |
| 12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
| 7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
| 2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
| 12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
| 7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |