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23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism

[view that people should put themselves first]

26 ideas
We should behave well even if invisible, for the health of the mind [Plato]
     Full Idea: There's nothing better for the mind than morality, and a person ought to behave morally whether or not he owns Gyges' ring.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 612b)
Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato]
     Full Idea: Wickedness is a sedition and illness of the soul.
     From: Plato (The Sophist [c.359 BCE], 228b)
For a Cyrenaic no one is of equal importance to himself [Aristippus young, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: A Cyrenaic will not consider anyone else of equal importance with himself.
     From: report of Aristippus the younger (fragments/reports [c.335 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.7.9
Nobody would choose all the good things in world, if the price was loss of identity [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Nobody would choose to have all the good things in the world at the price of becoming somebody else.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1166a23)
     A reaction: This now looks like a particularly good objection to utilitarianism, which aims to promote pleasure, no matter what the cost.
A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1168b09)
     A reaction: Both halves of this sound odd. Being your own best friend has all the oddness of self-identity. Maybe this sort of self-love should be resisted. Altruistic people are lovely.
Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: One's own interest is a relative good, nobility a good absolutely.
     From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1389b)
     A reaction: The key idea in the whole of Greek moral theory is the concept of what we can call a 'beautiful' action. Such things, or course, tend to be visible in great actions, such as sparing an enemy, rather than the minutiae of well-mannered daily life.
The greatest good is not the achievement of desire, but to desire what is proper [Menedemus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Hearing someone assert that the greatest good was to succeed in everything that one desires, he said,"It is a much greater good to desire what is proper".
     From: report of Menedemus (fragments/reports [c.310 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.16.12
Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3)
Reason demands nothing contrary to nature, and so it demands self-love [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: As reason makes no demands contrary to nature, it demands that every man should love himself, should seek that which is useful to him.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 18)
     A reaction: Maybe nature seems to demand self-love, but I don't see why reason should demand it, only why reason should not deny it. There is no point in denying something unavoidable. However, if we don't love ourselves, no one else is likely to.
Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: Self-satisfaction is the highest thing for which we can hope, for no one endeavours to preserve his being for the same of any end. [Pr 53: Humility is not a virtue]
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 52)
     A reaction: You can sense here that Spinoza was not a family man.
Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury]
     Full Idea: Though no creature can be called good merely for possessing the self-preserving affections, it is impossible that public good can be preserved without them; so that a creature wanting in them is wanting in natural rectitude, and may be esteemed vicious.
     From: 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury (Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit [1699], II.I.III)
     A reaction: Aristotle held a similar view (Idea 92). I think maybe Shaftesbury was the last call of the Aristotelians, before being engulfed by utilitarians and Kantians. This idea is at the core of capitalism.
No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume]
     Full Idea: What theory of morals can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show, by a particular detail, that all the duties which it recommends, are also the true interest of each individual?
     From: David Hume (Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals [1751], IX.II.228)
     A reaction: It is hard to disagree, even if occasional cases of extreme altruism can occur.
Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray]
     Full Idea: Sidgwick said self-interest is not self-evidently rational. Unless we invoke a religious idea of the soul, human personality is no more than a succession of continuities in memory and behaviour. In that case, why should anyone favour their future self?
     From: report of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics (7th edn) [1874]) by John Gray - Seven Types of Atheism 2
     A reaction: This sounds like Locke's account of the self, as psychological continuity. We can say that our continuous self is a fiction, the hero of our own narrative. Personally I think of the self as a sustained set of brains structures which change very little.
The noble soul has reverence for itself [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The noble soul has reverence for itself.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §287)
People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Whatever they say about their 'egotism', people nevertheless do nothing their whole life long for their ego, but instead for the phantom ego that has formed in the heads around them and been communicated to them.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 105)
     A reaction: Nietzsche has a vision of true devotion to the ego as healthy, and so (I would say) does Aristotle, though the two might disagree about the details. I want to live among people who work on themselves, not those who always sacrifice themselves.
Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel]
     Full Idea: Nietzsche's rejection of impersonal morality is an assertion of the dominance of the ideal of living well.
     From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I) by Thomas Nagel - The View from Nowhere X.2
Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: It was only when aristocratic value judgements declined that the whole antithesis of "egoistic" and "unegoistic" obtruded itself more and more on the human conscience.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§02)
     A reaction: But Aristotle, who is no aristocrat, has a balanced and sensible view of 'egoism', where it isn't the patronising arrogance that Nietzsche seems to like, but a proper concern with one's own character.
A wholly altruistic morality, with no egoism, is a thoroughly bad thing [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: An 'altruistic' morality, a morality under which egoism languishes - is under all circumstances a bad sign.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Twilight of the Idols [1889], 8.35)
Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: There cannot be anything other than egoism; in men whose ego is weak and thin the power of great love also grows weak.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §362)
     A reaction: We have captured this now in the popular psychological notion of 'low self-esteem', which blights a persons behaviour. It runs counter to the Christian ideal of self-effacing altruism.
The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Egoism! But no one has yet asked: what kind of ego? On the contrary, everyone unconsciously thinks every ego equal to every other ego.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §364)
     A reaction: The implication, I presume, is that you should be egoistic if you have a really excellent ego, but very altruistic if you are a loser. Or a slave. Or a monk.
The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The 'subject' is only a fiction: the ego of which one speaks when one censures egoism does not exist at all.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Will to Power (notebooks) [1888], §370)
     A reaction: This is the true Nietzsche, the nihilistic relativist. On optimistic days he thought some people had quivering dynamic egoes, to which they apparently owe duties, as one might to a great talent with which one was born.
Morality would improve if people could pursue private interests [Weil]
     Full Idea: The common run of moralists complain that man is moved by his private interest: would to heaven it were so!
     From: Simone Weil (Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression [1934], p.65)
     A reaction: Her point is that currently people have to sacrifice their own interests to communal activities which offer dubious benefits.
Good actions can never be justified by the good they brings to their agent [Foot]
     Full Idea: There is no good case for assessing the goodness of human action by reference only to good that each person brings to himself.
     From: Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)
     A reaction: She observes that even non-human animals often act for non-selfish reasons. The significance of this is its rejection of her much earlier view that virtues are justified by the good they bring their possessor.
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: Far from demonstrating a flaw in character or being a sign of weakness, coming to love oneself is the deepest and most essential - and by no means the most readily attainable - achievement of a serious and successful life.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (The Reasons of Love [2005], 2.14)
     A reaction: Obviously it will be necessary to dilineate the healthy form of self-love, which Frankfurt attempts to do. Ruthless vanity and self-seeking certainly look like the worst possible weaknesses of character. With that proviso, he is right.
Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham]
     Full Idea: Egoism is inadequate as a guide to good living. Though it tells us what to do, given pre-existent desires, it cannot help us critically form those desires.
     From: Gordon Graham (Eight Theories of Ethics [2004], Ch.9)
     A reaction: A crucial point in morality. It also applies to utilitarianism (should I change my capacity for pleasure?), and virtue theory (how should I genetically engineer 'human nature'?). I think these problems push us towards Platonism. See Idea 4840.
Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: The personal concern which begins with one's life in a particular body finds its place in ever-widening spheres of agency and enterprise, developing finally into a personal concern for the impersonal.
     From: Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
     A reaction: I am very struck by this nice thought, which comes from a very committed Kantian. It seems to me to capture the modern orthodoxy in ethical thinking - that concern for one's self, rather than altruism, is central, but altruism should follow from it.