| 1650 | For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates] |
| 21828 | A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus] |
| 5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
| 12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke] |
| 1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke] |
| 12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke] |
| 12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke] |
| 12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke] |
| 1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan] |
| 12973 | We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz] |
| 21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume] |
| 21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
| 7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
| 7946 | The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C] |
| 1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
| 5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
| 5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
| 5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
| 23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
| 5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
| 5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
| 7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |