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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / a. Descriptions

[general ideas about stating characteristics of objects]

4 ideas
'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell]
     Full Idea: In 'I met a unicorn' the four words together make a significant proposition, and the word 'unicorn' is significant, …but the two words 'a unicorn' do not form a group having a meaning of its own. It is an indefinite description describing nothing.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy [1919], XVI)
Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: Donnellan objects that Russell's theory of definite descriptions overlooks the referential use (Russell writes as if all descriptions are used attributively), and that Strawson assumes they are all used referentially, to draw attention to things.
     From: report of Keith Donnellan (Reference and Definite Descriptions [1966]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1
     A reaction: This seems like a nice little success for analytical philosophy - clarifying a horrible mess by making a simple distinction that leaves everyone happy.
An object can be described without being referred to [Bach]
     Full Idea: An object can be described without being referred to.
     From: Kent Bach (What Does It Take to Refer? [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: I'm not clear how this is possible for a well-known object, though it is clearly possible for a speculative object, such as a gadget I would like to buy. In the former case reference seems to occur even if the speaker is trying to avoid it.
Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames]
     Full Idea: The indefinite description in 'A man will meet you' is naturally treated as quantificational, but an occurrence in predicative position, in 'Jones is not a philosopher', doesn't have a natural quantificational counterpart.
     From: Scott Soames (Philosophy of Language [2010], 1.23)