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15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia

[what we should take qualia to be]

17 ideas
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry on Jackson]
I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry on Jackson]
Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge [Jackson]
Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim]
Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis]
What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett]
Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Lowe on Dennett]
Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia [Rey]
Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey]
Why qualia, and why this particular quale? [Rey]
If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane]
Sometimes we don't notice our pains [Chalmers]
Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement? [Chalmers]
Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R]