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3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth

[significance of formal defintions of linguistic truth]

35 ideas
If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski]
Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Field,H on Tarski]
A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski]
Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski]
Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Read on Tarski]
Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski]
Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Walicki on Tarski]
Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Halbach on Tarski]
Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine]
The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P]
In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam]
Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam]
Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam]
Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam]
The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor]
What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor]
Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett]
Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Davidson on Dummett]
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson]
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Horsten on Kripke]
Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Horsten on Kripke]
Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Haack]
Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes]
Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes]
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta]
A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price]
'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach]
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]