| 205 | Protagoras contradicts himself by saying virtue is teachable, but then that it is not knowledge [Plato on Protagoras] |
| Full Idea: Protagoras claimed that virtue was teachable, but now tries to show it is not knowledge, which makes it less likely to be teachable. | |
| From: comment on Protagoras (fragments/reports [c.441 BCE]) by Plato - Protagoras 361b |
| 4323 | Socrates is torn between intellectual virtue, which is united and teachable, and natural virtue, which isn't [PG on Socrates] |
| Full Idea: Socrates worries about the unity and teachability of virtue because he is torn between virtue as intellectual (unified and teachable) and virtue as natural (plural and unteachable). | |
| From: comment on Socrates (reports of career [c.420 BCE]) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: Admittedly virtue could be natural but still unified and teachable, but Socrates clearly had a dilemma, and this seems to make sense of it. |
| 8003 | Socrates agrees that virtue is teachable, but then denies that there are teachers [Socrates, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: Socrates' great point of agreement with the sophists is his acceptance of the thesis that areté is teachable. But paradoxically he denies that there are teachers. | |
| From: report of Socrates (reports of career [c.420 BCE]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.3 | |
| A reaction: This is part of Socrates's presentation of himself as 'not worthy'. Virtue would be teachable, if only anyone knew what it was. He's wrong. Lots of people have a pretty good idea of virtue, and could teach it. The problem is in the pupils. |
| 21385 | Antisthenes said virtue is teachable and permanent, is life's goal, and is like universal wealth [Antisthenes (I), by Long] |
| Full Idea: The moral propositions of Antisthenes foreshadowed the Stoics: virtue can be taught and once acquired cannot be lost (fr.69,71); virtue is the goal of life (22); the sage is self-sufficient, since he has (by being wise) the wealth of all men (8o). | |
| From: report of Antisthenes (Ath) (fragments/reports [c.405 BCE]) by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 1 | |
| A reaction: [He cites Caizzi for the fragments] The distinctive idea here is (I think) that once acquired virtue can never be lost. It sounds plausible, but I'm wondering why it should be true. Is it like riding a bicycle, or like learning to speak Russian? |
| 235 | Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Virtue is the aim of the laws the legislator lays down. | |
| From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 631a) |
| 1913 | Is virtue taught, or achieved by practice, or a natural aptitude, or what? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Is virtue something that can be taught, or does it come by practice, or is it a natural aptitude, or something else? | |
| From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 70a) |
| 1921 | If virtue is a type of knowledge then it ought to be taught [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If virtue is some sort of knowledge, then clearly it could be taught. | |
| From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 87c) |
| 1927 | It seems that virtue is neither natural nor taught, but is a divine gift [Plato] |
| Full Idea: If our discussion is right, virtue is acquired neither by nature nor by teaching. Whoever has it gets it by divine dispensation, without taking thought. | |
| From: Plato (Meno [c.385 BCE], 99e) |
| 188 | Socrates did not believe that virtue could be taught [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates: I do not believe that virtue can be taught. | |
| From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 320b) |
| 189 | If we punish wrong-doers, it shows that we believe virtue can be taught [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Athenians inflict punishment on wrong-doers, which shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness. | |
| From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 324c) |
| 204 | Socrates is contradicting himself in claiming virtue can't be taught, but that it is knowledge [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Socrates is contradicting himself by saying virtue is not teachable, and yet trying to demonstrate that every virtue is knowledge. | |
| From: Plato (Protagoras [c.380 BCE], 361b) |
| 43 | Nature enables us to be virtuous, but habit develops virtue in us [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Moral virtues are neither by nor contrary to nature; we are constituted to receive them, but their full development is due to habit. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103a21) | |
| A reaction: The notion of the habit of virtue is hugely important, precisely because such an idea is missing in Hobbes, Bentham and Kant. The concept of a true 'lady' or 'gentleman'. |
| 44 | We acquire virtues by habitually performing good deeds [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: We become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b01) | |
| A reaction: This is the circularity which is sometimes criticised, but seems to be benign. When two good things reinforce one another, that is not a vicious circle. |
| 5152 | Like activities produce like dispositions, so we must give the right quality to the activity [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Like activities produce like dispositions; hence we must give our activities a certain quality, because it is their characteristics that determine the resulting dispositions. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1103b22) | |
| A reaction: Who doubts that a child brought up working for a charity would tend to be charitable, and one brought up amidst crime would tend to criminality? I just wish Aristotle could pin down the 'certain quality' the acts are supposed to have. 'Fine', I suppose. |
| 4378 | We must practise virtuous acts because practice actually teaches us the nature of virtue [Burnyeat on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle is not giving us a bland reminder that virtue takes practice; rather, practice has cognitive powers, in that it is the way that we learn what is noble and just. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b02) by Myles F. Burnyeat - Aristotle on Learning to be Good p.73 | |
| A reaction: Interesting. This seems right about Aristotle, and suggests that we come to appreciate the arts (for example) by doing them rather than studying them. (NE 1147a21) |
| 51 | True education is training from infancy to have correct feelings [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The importance of having been trained in some way from infancy to feel joy and grief at the right things; true education is precisely this. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1104b14) | |
| A reaction: I love this. I suspect the majority of parents neglect this, and allow children to indulge in feelings (both pro and anti) which will diminish them in later life. |
| 6793 | People can break into the circle of virtue and good action, by chance, or with help [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is possible to get started in virtuous action without being virtuous, just as it is in the arts; it is possible to put a few words together correctly by accident, or at the prompting of another person. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105a24) | |
| A reaction: This is a crucial idea, applicable in many areas. Philosophers love to say that it is logically impossible to get started in something (e.g. scientific theory and scientific observation) because of circularity. But they are wrong. |
| 57 | We acquire virtue by the repeated performance of just and temperate acts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is from the repeated performance of just and temperate acts that we acquire virtues. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1105b04) | |
| A reaction: Presumably one can endlessly compel a child or an employee or a slave to perform just and temperate acts, but still not generate the actual virtue. |
| 2690 | Associating with good people can be a training in virtue [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: A sort of training in virtue may result from associating with good people. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1170a12) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle doesn't say much about role models, but they strike me as basic to moral education. Good habits are largely acquired by copying. Teach the young to admire the right people. Not media celebrities! |
| 499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043) |
| 524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66 |
| 23405 | Rituals escape natural chaos, and benefit everyone, by reshaping our motivations [Xunzi (Xun Kuang), by Norden] |
| Full Idea: For Xunzi, everyone is better off with rituals …because they allow us to escape the chaotic state of nature. They do not merely set rules for entitlement, though. They are effective because they reshape human motivation. | |
| From: report of Xunzi (Xun Kuang) (The Xunzi [c.250 BCE]) by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 10.2 | |
| A reaction: Rituals are a basic part of Confucianist thinking, and may be puzzling to outsiders. At there worst rituals are brain-washing, but teaching children good manners is a sort of ritual, meant to channel feelings in a healthy direction |
| 23406 | Rituals don't arise from human nature; they are the deliberate creations of a sage [Xunzi (Xun Kuang)] |
| Full Idea: Rituals and standards of righteousness and proper models and measures are produced from the deliberate efforts of the sage; they are not produced from people's nature. | |
| From: Xunzi (Xun Kuang) (The Xunzi [c.250 BCE], 23), quoted by Bryan van Norden - Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy 10.III | |
| A reaction: This is not to say that the sage is not in tune with nature. Human nature is often seen as a sprouting seed, which needs careful husbandry to bring out its best. |
| 8009 | Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: The Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (unlike St Augustine's Platonism) is not concerned with escaping from the snares of the world and of desire, but with transforming desire for moral ends. | |
| From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: This is very close to Aristotle himself, for whom education of the feelings (into good habits, and then true virtues) was central. Education of feelings should be central to all education (though young psychopaths may show resistance). |
| 21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
| Full Idea: If the practice of virtue were to become a habit the subject would suffer loss to that freedom in adopting his maxims which distinguishes an action done from duty. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue [1797], 409 Intro XVI) | |
| A reaction: Looks like a misunderstanding of Aristotle, who always promotes the role of 'phronesis' [practical reason], and never advocates unthinking virtuous habits. I think Aristotle would ask how you select your maxim, if you lack the virtues. |
| 22340 | It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: It is the historical, individual, nature of the virtues as actually exemplified which makes it difficult to learn goodness from another person. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: A penetrating remark, which strikes me as true. When confronted with a virtuous person you might want to acquire their virtue, just as you might want them to teach you algebra, but their virtues are too bound up with their individuality. |
| 22349 | Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: The enjoyment of art is a training in the love of virtue. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
| A reaction: Very Aristotelian to talk of 'training'. Unfortunately it is children who have the greatest need for training, but most art is aimed at mature adults. Can you be too old to be trained by art, even if you enjoy it? |
| 7095 | Moral education is better by concrete example than abstract principle [Statman] |
| Full Idea: According to virtue theory, education through moral exemplars is more effective than education focused on principles and obligations, because it is far more concrete. | |
| From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §3) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle's view is that virtues must be developed from childhood, when principles don't mean much. The problem is that young people may witness highly virtuous behaviour in their exemplars, but totally fail to appreciate it without mention of principles. |