| 2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions. | |
| From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §2.24) |
| 23661 | We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid] |
| Full Idea: We can have no communication, no correspondence or society with any created being, but by means of our senses. And, until we rely on their testimony, we must consider ourselves as being alone in the universe. | |
| From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 6: Judgement [1785], 5) | |
| A reaction: I'm not aware of any thinker before this so directly addressing solipsism. Even the champion of direct and common sense realism has to recognise the intermediary of our senses when accepting other minds. |
| 6932 | Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach] |
| Full Idea: Only through communication and conversation between man and man do ideas arise; not alone, but only with others, does one reach notions and reason in general. | |
| From: Ludwig Feuerbach (Principles of Philosophy of the Future [1843], §41) | |
| A reaction: This is a strikingly modern view of the solipsism problem, and is close in spirit to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument (Ideas 4143 +4158). Feuerbach is interested in universals rather than rules. I prefer Feuerbach. |
| 5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
| Full Idea: No logical absurdity results from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that everything else is mere fancy. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (Problems of Philosophy [1912], Ch. 2) | |
| A reaction: The only real attempt to meet this challenge is Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument, which tried to show that it would be a logical impossibility to speak a language if there were no other minds. Personally, I am with Russell. |
| 23503 | Strict solipsism is pure realism, with the self as a mere point in surrounding reality [Wittgenstein] |
| Full Idea: Solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it. | |
| From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.64) | |
| A reaction: Despite this, Michael Morris is more inclined to see him as an idealist. It is not clear whether the present account of solipsism is idealist or realist. Berkeley seemed to think his idealism was true realism. Can reality be co-ordinated with a point? |
| 2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
| Full Idea: Extreme solipsism only considers present experiences, but more relaxed solipsism may include past and possible future experiences. | |
| From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 9.5) |
| 21227 | The Cogito demands a bridge to the world, and ends in isolating the ego [Velarde-Mayol] |
| Full Idea: All philosophies inspired in the Cogito have the problem of building a bridge from the starting point of consciousness to the external world. The result of this is the isolation and solitude of the very ego. | |
| From: Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Husserl [2000], 4.7.2) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good reason not to develop a philosophy which is inspired by the Cogito. |
| 10357 | Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind [Kusch] |
| Full Idea: 'Methodological solipsism' says merely that everyone can conceive of themselves as the only subject. Everyone can construct all referents of their thought and talk out of complexes of their very own experience. | |
| From: Martin Kusch (Knowledge by Agreement [2002], Ch.19) | |
| A reaction: The possibility of this can be denied (e.g. by Putnam 1983, dating back to Wittgenstein). I too would doubt it, though finding a good argument seems a forlorn hope. |