structure for 'Modes of Existence'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     unexpand these ideas

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism

[general ideas about nominalism]

17 ideas
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Scotus argued that there must be some non-singular aspects of things, since there are some 'less than numerical differences' among them. A horse and a tulip differ more from each other than do two horses.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns'
     A reaction: This seems to treat being 'singular' as if it were being a singularity. Presumably he is contemplating a thing being nothing but its Scotist haecceity. A neat argument, but I don't buy it.
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Scotus argued that if everything is singular, with no objective common feature, science would be impossible, as it proceeds from general concepts. General is the opposite of singular, so it would be inadequate to understand a singular reality.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns'
     A reaction: [compressed] It is a fact that if you generalise about 'tigers', you are glossing over the individuality of each singular tiger. That is OK for 'electron', if they really are identical, but our general predicates may be imposing identity on electrons.
Only individual bodies exist [Bacon]
     Full Idea: Nothing truly exists in nature beyond individual bodies.
     From: Francis Bacon (The New Organon [1620]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 182
     A reaction: [Unusually, Pasnau gives no reference in the text; possibly II:1-2] What this leaves out, from even an auster nominalist ontology, is undifferentiated stuff like water. Even electrons don't seem quite distinct from one another.
Obviously 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates has wisdom' express the same fact [Ramsey]
     Full Idea: It seems to me as clear as anything can be in philosophy that the two sentences 'Socrates is wise' and 'wisdom is a characteristic of Socrates' assert the same fact and express the same proposition.
     From: Frank P. Ramsey (Universals [1925], p.12)
     A reaction: Could be challenged. One says Socrates is just the way he is, the other says he is attached to an abstract entity greater than himself. The squabble over universals has become a squabble over logical form. Finding logical form needs metaphysics!
I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski]
     Full Idea: I am a nominalist. This is a very deep conviction of mine. ...I am a tortured nominalist.
     From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int I
     A reaction: I too am of the nominalist persuasion, but I don't feel justified in such a strong commitment.
Refusal to explain why different tokens are of the same type is to be an ostrich [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: A philosophical account of a general sort is required of what it is for different tokens to be of the same type. To refuse to give such an account is to be a metaphysical ostrich.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Against 'Ostrich Nominalism' [1980], §1)
     A reaction: This defines Ostrich Nominalism (a label Armstrong aims at Quine). I certainly sympathise with Armstrong. If there is no more to a class (a type) than just having members (tokens), nothing is explain. What is natural, essential, intensional etc.?
Nominalism only makes sense if it is materialist [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Nominalists must at heart be materialists, or so it seems to me: otherwise their scruples are unintelligible.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Philosophy of Logic [1971], Ch.5)
     A reaction: This is modern nominalism - the rejection of abstract objects. I largely plead guilty to both charges.
'Nominalism' used to mean denial of universals, but now means denial of abstract objects [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The original sense of 'nominalism' is the denial of universals, that is the denial of reference to either predicates or to abstract nouns. The modern sense (of Nelson Goodman) is the denial of the existence of abstract objects.
     From: Michael Dummett (Frege Philosophy of Language (2nd ed) [1973], Ch.14)
     A reaction: This is why you find loads of modern philosophers vigorous attacking nominalism, only to gradually realise that they don't actually believe in universals, as traditionally understood. It's hard to keep up, when words shift their meaning.
Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett]
     Full Idea: The nominalist superstition is based ultimately on the myth of the unmediated presentation of genuine concrete objects to the mind.
     From: Michael Dummett (Frege philosophy of mathematics [1991], Ch.18)
     A reaction: Personally I am inclined to favour nominalism and a representative theory of perception, which acknowledges some 'mediation', but of a non-linguistic form. Any good theory here had better include animals, which seem to form concepts.
For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
     Full Idea: For the nominalist, belonging to the extension of a predicate is just an inexplicable ultimate fact.
     From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 1.2)
     A reaction: I sometimes think of myself as a nominalist, but when it is summarised in Molnar's way I back off. He seem to be offering a third way, between platonic realism and nominalism. It is physical essentialist realism, I think.
Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
     Full Idea: A nominalist will only countenance first-order logic.
     From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.2.2)
     A reaction: This is because nominalist will not acknowledge properties as entities to be quantified over. Plural quantification seems to be a strategy for extending first-order logic while retaining nominalist sympathies.
Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
     Full Idea: We can say that 'Harvard-nominalism' is the thesis that there are no abstract objects, 'Oz-nominalism' that there are no universals, and Goodman's nominalism rejects entities, such as sets, which fail to obey a certain principle of composition.
     From: Alex Oliver (The Metaphysics of Properties [1996], §15 n46)
     A reaction: Personally I'm a Goodman-Harvard-Oz nominalist. What are you rebelling against? What have you got? We've been mesmerized by the workings of our own minds, which are trying to grapple with a purely physical world.
Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
     Full Idea: The two main motivations for nominalism are an admirable commitment to Ockham's Razor, and a queasiness about postulating entities that are unobservable or non-empirical, existing in a non-physical realm.
     From: J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz (Platonistic Theories of Universals [2003], 3)
     A reaction: It doesn't follow that because the entities are unobservable that they are non-physical. Consider the 'interior' of an electron. Neverless I share a love of Ockham's Razor and a deep caution about unobservables.
Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux]
     Full Idea: In return for a one-category ontology (with particulars but no universals), the austere nominalist is forced to take a whole host of things (like being red, or triangular, or human) as unanalysable or primitive.
     From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.68)
     A reaction: I see that 'red' might have to be primitive, but being human can just be a collection of particulars. It is no ontologically worse to call them 'primitive' than to say they exist.
Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson]
     Full Idea: The nominalist suspects that properties, relations and states of affairs are mere projections onto the world of our forms of speech. One source of the suspicion is a sense that we could just as well have classified things differently.
     From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 9.3)
     A reaction: I know it is very wicked to say so, but I'm afraid I have some sympathy with this view. But I like the primary/secondary distinction, so there is more 'projection' in the latter case. Classification is not random; it is a response to reality.
A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford]
     Full Idea: A 'porridge' nominalist denies natural kinds, and thinks there are no objective divisions in reality, so concepts or words can be used by a community to divide the world up in any way that suits their purposes.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Laws in Nature [2004], 07.3)
Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland]
     Full Idea: Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals.
     From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Clearly there is going to be quite a struggle to make sense of 'exists' here (Russell tries 'subsists). Presumably each property must be a particular?