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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason

[claim that there is a reason for everything]

23 ideas
The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Something which is established in the centre and has equality in relation to the extremes has no more reason to move up than it has down or to the sides (so the earth is stationary)
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], A26) by Aristotle - On the Heavens 295b11
Everything happens necessarily, and for a reason [Democritus]
     Full Idea: Nothing happens at random, but everything for a reason and as the effect of necessity.
     From: Democritus (fragments/reports [c.431 BCE], B002), quoted by Pseudo-Plutarch - On the Doctrine of the Philosophers 1.25.4
     A reaction: [In Aetius 'Stob'] This remark reminds us of the link between necessity and sufficient reason. Do all reasons arise for a reason?
Nothing can come to be without a cause [Plato]
     Full Idea: Nothing can come to be without a cause.
     From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28a)
Chrysippus said the uncaused is non-existent [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus said that the uncaused is altogether non-existent.
     From: report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1045c
     A reaction: The difficulty is to see what empirical basis there can be for such a claim, or what argument of any kind other than an intuition. Induction is the obvious answer, but Hume teaches us scepticism about any claim that 'there can be no exceptions'.
There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: There is necessarily for each existent thing a cause why it should exist.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Pr 08 n2)
     A reaction: The obvious response is 'how do you know that?' It has to the sort of a priori commitment we expect from a rationalist philosopher. It seems to me quite an appealing candidate for an axiom of human understanding.
No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The principle of sufficient reason says no fact can be real or existing and no proposition can be true unless there is a sufficient reason why it should be thus and not otherwise, even though in most cases these reasons cannot be known to us.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716], §32)
     A reaction: I think of this as my earliest philosophical perception, a childish rebellion against being told that there was 'no reason' for something. My intuition tells me that it is correct, and the foundation of ontology and truth. Don't ask me to justify it!
For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Nothing ever takes place without its being possible for one who knew everything to give some reason why it should have happened rather than not.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letter on Freedom [1689], p.112)
     A reaction: Presumably there will be GOOD reason why genocide occurs. Note that there is a reason for every 'event'. Is there a reason for every truth? Presumably not, or there would have to be reasons for self-evident truths.
The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: In order to proceed from mathematics to physics the principle of sufficient reason is necessary, that nothing happens without there being a reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], §2)
There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Nothing happens without a sufficient reason why it should be thus rather than otherwise.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.2)
No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: There is no possible reason which could limit the quantity of matter; therefore there cannot in fact be any such limitation.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.21)
Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Leibniz assigns synthetic a priori status to the principle of sufficient reason, readily conceding that one can deny it without fear of inconsistency.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.18
Sufficient reason is implied by contradiction, of an insufficient possible which exists [Wolff, by Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: Wolff believed that the principle of sufficient reason could be derived from the principle of contradiction, for there would be a contradiction in the insufficiently determined existence of a merely possible thing.
     From: report of Christian Wolff (works [1730]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to Ethics, Politics, Religion in Kant 'A child'
     A reaction: Sounds as if he might be begging to question. You would only protest against the insufficient determination of something if you already believed in the principle of sufficient reason. Nice try.
Both nature and reason require that everything has a cause [Rousseau]
     Full Idea: Under the law of reason nothing takes place without a cause, any more than under the law of nature.
     From: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (The Social Contract (tr Cress) [1762], II.04)
     A reaction: Is this the influence of Leibniz? Note that the principle is identified in two different areas, so in nature we may say 'everything has a cause', and in rationality we may say 'there is a reason for everything'. But are these the same?
The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant]
     Full Idea: The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience, namely the objective cognition of appearances with regard to their relation in the successive series of time.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B246/A201)
     A reaction: The argument to this claim from the necessity of succession in time looks unconvincing to me, but the principle of sufficient reason is deeply imbedded in the human mind. However, philosophers seem to feel it more strongly than other people.
Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant]
     Full Idea: A proof of the principle of sufficient reason has often been sought, but always in vain.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B265/A217)
     A reaction: This might, of course, be because the principle is false. However it is quite a good candidate for an a priori, or even innate, principle of thought in rational beings. Gödel's Theorem suggests why the enterprise of proof would be doomed.
Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte]
     Full Idea: The principle of sufficient reason is the point of transition from the particular, which is itself, to the general, which is outside it.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but it seems worth passing on. Personally I would say that we have a knack of generalising, triggered when we spot patterns.
Making sufficient reason an absolute devalues the principle of non-contradiction [Hegel, by Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: Hegel saw that the absolutization of the principle of sufficient reason (which marked the culmination of the belief in the necessity of what is) required the devaluation of the principle of non-contradiction.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (works [1812], 3) by Quentin Meillassoux - After Finitude; the necessity of contingency 3
     A reaction: I pass this on without understanding it, though a joint study of my collection of ideas on sufficient reason and non-contradiction might make it clear. [Let me know if you can explain it!]
'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer]
     Full Idea: The Principle may be stated as 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be', which is a generalisation of the assumption which justifies the question 'Why?', which is the mother of all science.
     From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.I)
     A reaction: This faith is the core of philosophy, to be maintained against all defeatists like Wittgenstein and Colin McGinn. Reality must be rational, or we wouldn't be here to think about it. (Maybe!)
Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
     Full Idea: Schopenhauer said the principle of sufficient reason is not susceptible to proof for the simple reason that it is presupposed in any argument or proof.
     From: report of Arthur Schopenhauer (Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason [1813], §14 p.32-3) by Peter B. Lewis - Schopenhauer 3
     A reaction: I would have thought it might be disproved by a counterexample, such as the Gödel sentence of his incompleteness proof, or quantum effects which seem to elude causation. Personally I believe the principle, which I see as the first axiom of philosophy.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
     Full Idea: The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations.
     From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §3.28)
     A reaction: This sounds a reasonable note of caution, but doesn't carry much weight unless some type of non-causal reason can be envisaged. God's free will? Our free will? The laws of causation?
If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
     Full Idea: So long as we continue to believe that there is a reason why things are the way they are rather than some other way, we will construe this world is a mystery, since no such reason will every be vouchsafed to us.
     From: Quentin Meillassoux (After Finitude; the necessity of contingency [2006], 4)
     A reaction: Giving up sufficient reason sounds like a rather drastic response to this. Put it like this: Will we ever be able to explain absolutely everything? No. So will the world always be a little mysterious to us? Yes, obviously. Is that a problem? No!
Is Sufficient Reason self-refuting (no reason to accept it!), or is it a legitimate explanatory tool? [Bourne]
     Full Idea: Mackie (1983) dismisses the Principle of Sufficient Reason quickly, arguing that it is self-refuting: there is no sufficient reason to accept it. However, a principle is not invalidated by not applying to itself; it can be a powerful heuristic tool.
     From: Craig Bourne (A Future for Presentism [2006], 6.VI)
     A reaction: If God was entirely rational, and created everything, that would be a sufficient reason to accept the principle. You would never, though, get to the reason why God was entirely rational. Something will always elude the principle.
Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
     From: Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
     A reaction: A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!