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19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity

[what double meanings show about language]

4 ideas
The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid]
     Full Idea: There is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words.
     From: Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 1: Preliminary [1785], 1)
     A reaction: He means that ambiguity leads to long pointless disagreements.
Derrida focuses on ambiguity, but talks of 'dissemination', not traditional multiple meanings [Derrida]
     Full Idea: Derrida affirms something like an 'ambiguity of meaning'. But he explicitly contrasts the word he uses to characterize the phenomenon at issue, what he calls 'dissemination', with the traditional concept of 'polysemia' - multiple meanings.
     From: Jacques Derrida (Of Grammatology [1967]), quoted by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 2 'After'
     A reaction: The point, I presume, is that there is vagueness and elision to the meanings, rather than a list of options, such as bank/bank. Context (sense-making paths) is crucial for Derrida. Can the analytic apparatus for the logic of vagueness be brought to bear?
'Dissemination' is opposed to polysemia, since that is irreducible, because of multiple understandings [Derrida, by Glendinning]
     Full Idea: The intention to oppose polysemia with dissemination does not aim to affirm that everything we say is ambiguous, but that polysemia is irreducible in the sense that each and every 'meaning' is itself subject to more than one understanding.
     From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Simon Glendinning - Derrida: A Very Short Introduction 5
     A reaction: The key point, I think, is that ambiguity and polysemia are not failures of language (which is the way most logicians see it), but part of the essential and irreducible nature of language. Nietzsche started this line of thought.
Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman]
     Full Idea: Ambiguity results from the possibility of transforming different underlying truth-conditional structures into the same surface form.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 5.3)
     A reaction: Personally I would call a 'truth-conditional structure' a 'proposition', and leave it to the philosophers to decide what a proposition is.