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7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms

[reality built up from the smallest components of logic]

24 ideas
Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke]
     Full Idea: All comparisons terminate in, and are concerned about those simple ideas, either of sensation or reflection; which I think to be the whole material of all our knowledge.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.25.09)
     A reaction: This seems to be an ancestor of logical atomism. Hume is inclined to make his 'atoms' strictly empirical (as 'impressions'), but Locke also allows simples of reflection, which may be a priori conceptual atoms.
Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell]
     Full Idea: Perhaps one atomic fact may sometimes be capable of being inferred from another, though I do not believe this to be the case; but in any case it cannot be inferred from premises no one of which is an atomic fact.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Our Knowledge of the External World [1914], p.48)
     A reaction: I prefer Russell's caution to Wittgenstein's dogmatism. I presume utterly simple facts give you nothing to work with. Hegel thought that you could infer new concepts from given concepts.
Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
     Full Idea: Russell preceded Wittgenstein in deciding that the reduction of all propositions to atomic propositions could not be achieved. The problem cases were negative propositions, general propositions, and belief propositions.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.1
To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
     Full Idea: The way to mean a fact is to assert it; the way to mean a simple is to name it.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.156)
     A reaction: Thus logical atomism is a linguistic programme, of reducing our language to a foundation of pure names. The recent thought of McDowell and others is aimed at undermining any possibility of a 'simple' in perception. The myth of 'The Given'.
'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
     Full Idea: When I speak of 'simples' I am speaking of something not experienced as such, but known only inferentially as the limits of analysis.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.158)
     A reaction: He claims that the simples are 'known', so he does not mean purely theoretical entities. They have something like the status of quarks in physics, whose existence is inferred from experience.
Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
     Full Idea: Whenever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Logical Atomism [1924], p.161), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7
     A reaction: In 1919 he said that the alternative, of 'postulating' new entities, has 'all the advantages of theft over honest toil' [IMP p.71]. This is Russell's commitment to 'constructing' everything, even his concept of matter. Arithmetic as PA is postulation.
In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
     Full Idea: In the years 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism.
     From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This is interesting (about Russell) because he only labelled it as 'logical atomism' in about 1912, and only wrote about it as such in 1918. It is helpful to understand that the theory of definite descriptions was part of his logical atomism.
Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
     Full Idea: I have come to think that, although many things can be known to be complex, nothing can be known to be simple.
     From: Bertrand Russell (My Philosophical Development [1959], Ch.14)
     A reaction: This appears to be a rejection of his logical atomism. It goes with a general rebellion against foundationalist epistemology, because the empiricists foundations (e.g. Hume's impressions) seem devoid of all content.
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
     Full Idea: Russell's new logical atomist ontology was of particulars, universals and facts, replacing the ontology of 'platonic atomism' consisting just of propositions.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 1
     A reaction: Linsky cites Peter Hylton as saying that the earlier view was never replaced. The earlier view required propositions to be 'unified'. I surmise that the formula 'Fa' combines a universal and a particular, to form an atomic fact. [...but Idea 6111!]
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
     Full Idea: In 1918 Russell does not admit facts as fundamental; atomic facts are atomic as facts go, but they are compound objects. The atoms of Russell's logical atomism are not atomic facts but sense data.
     From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Willard Quine - Russell's Ontological Development p.83
     A reaction: By about 1921 Russell had totally given up sense-data, because he had been reading behaviourist psychology.
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
     Full Idea: I call my doctrine logical atomism because, as the last residue of analysis, I wish to arrive at logical atoms and not physical atoms; some of them will be particulars, and others will be predicates and relations and so on.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I)
     A reaction: However we judge it, logical atomism is a vital landmark in the history of 'analytical' philosophy, because it lays out the ideal for our assessment. It is fashionable to denigrate analysis, but I think it is simply the nearest to wisdom we will ever get.
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
     Full Idea: When you have enumerated all the atomic facts in the world, it is a further fact about the world that those are all the atomic facts there are about the world.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §V)
     A reaction: There is obviously a potential regress of facts about facts here. This looks like one of the reasons why the original logical atomism had a short shelf-life. Personally I see this as an argument in favour of rationalism, in the way Bonjour argues for it.
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
     Full Idea: Logical atomism is the view that you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples, out of which the world is built, and that those simples have a kind of reality not belonging to anything else.
     From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VIII)
     A reaction: This dream is to empiricists what the Absolute is to rationalists - a bit silly, but an embodiment of the motivating dream.
Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell]
     Full Idea: Given all true atomic propositions, together with the fact that they are all, every other true proposition can theoretically be deduced by logical methods.
     From: Bertrand Russell (Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica [1925], p.xv)
     A reaction: This is evidently his strongest statement of the ideal underlying logical atomism. The atoms were initially sense-date, but then became atomic propositions saying an object has a property.
The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: In order for a proposition to be CAPABLE of making sense, the world must already have the logical structure it has. The logic of the world is prior to all truth and falsehood.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Notebooks 1914-1916 [1915], p.14c)
     A reaction: It seems that in Tractatus it is propositions about facts which are true or false, but prior to the facts are substance and the objects, and it is there that we find the logical structure of the world. I see this view as modern stoicism.
Atomic facts correspond to true elementary propositions [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: Atomic fact [Sachverhalt] is what corresponds to an elementary proposition [Elementarsatz] if it is true.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Letters to Russell [1919], CL 125)
     A reaction: This is perhaps the key to the Tractatus, because it is the binding point between world and language. A true realist would allow for atomic facts that may go beyond even possible propositions.
The 'Tractatus' is an extreme example of 'Logical Atomism' [Wittgenstein, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: The 'Tractatus' is an uncompromising, indeed an extreme, example of 'Logical Atomism'
     From: report of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921]) by A.C. Grayling - Wittgenstein Ch.2
     A reaction: Russell talked about his 'logical atomism' after 1918, but this reminds us that Wittgenstein was fulfilling a task set for him by Russell. Wittgenstein's atoms are names-plus-objects, Russell's are demonstratives-plus-sensedata.
In atomic facts the objects hang together like chain links [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: In an atomic fact [Sachverhalt] the objects hang one in another, like the links of a chain
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.03), quoted by Homer - The Iliad
     A reaction: So the world consists of facts, but the facts are composed of objects. The point seems to be that the truths of language refer to the facts, rather than to the objects. Objects 'don't hang' together in the fact of a chance encounter.
The structure of an atomic fact is how its objects combine; this possibility is its form [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: The way in which objects hang together in the atomic fact is the structure of the atomic fact. …The form is the possibility of the structure.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 2.032-3)
     A reaction: I very much like the way LW adds a modal dimension to his ontology. Why doesn't he talk of 'relations', rather than 'hanging together'?
If a proposition is elementary, no other elementary proposition contradicts it [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: It is a sign of a proposition's being elementary that there can be no elementary proposition contradicting it.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.211)
     A reaction: It is a hallmark of atomic atoms that they have no relations with other atoms, but are wholly independent. This obviously invites the question of how they are united. Are logical connectives intrinsically relational logical atoms?
Analysis must end in elementary propositions, which are combinations of names [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: It is obvious that in the analysis of propositions we must come to elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 4.221), quoted by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 50 'Indep'
     A reaction: Not clear about 'combinations of names'. Does that include predicates? How do you combine two names?
Nothing can be inferred from an elementary proposition [Wittgenstein]
     Full Idea: From an elementary proposition no other can be inferred.
     From: Ludwig Wittgenstein (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1921], 5.134)
     A reaction: Russell was not so sure. This is the sort of remark that elicits from me the question that extravagent metaphysics also provokes - 'how on earth does he know what he claims to be true?'.
Logical atomism builds on the simple properties, but are they the only possible properties? [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: One of the assumptions of logical atomism is that all structural properties, all complex properties, are composed of simple properties and relations. ...But does the totality of the simple properties consist of the only possible simple properties?
     From: David M. Armstrong (Truth and Truthmakers [2004], 07.3)
     A reaction: This refers to what Lewis calls 'alien' properties - possible properties that cannot even be constructed from actual properties. Armstrong's question is about the truthmakers for such things. A bit speculative...
Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
     Full Idea: The logical atomism of Russell admitted some logically complex facts but not others - in contrast to Wittgenstein's version which admitted only atomic facts.
     From: Fraser MacBride (Truthmakers [2013], 2.1.3)
     A reaction: For truthmakers, it looks as if the Wittgenstein version might do a better job (e.g. with negative truths). I quite like the Russell approach, where complex facts underwrite the logical connectives. Disjunctive, negative, conjunctive, hypothetical facts.