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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity

[being identical in category]

11 ideas
Things such as two different quadrangles are alike but not wholly the same [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Things are alike if they are not just the same simpliciter, exhibiting differences in their substrate substance but being formally the same. Examples are larger and smaller quadrangles and unequal straight lines, which are alike but not the same.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1054b06)
The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
     Full Idea: Armstrong conflates the type-token distinction with that between universals and particulars.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Theory of Universals [1978], xiii,16/17) by Harold Hodes - Logicism and Ontological Commits. of Arithmetic 147 n23
     A reaction: This seems quite reasonable, even if you don’t believe in the reality of universals. I'm beginning to think we should just use the term 'general' instead of 'universal'. 'Type' also seems to correspond to 'set', with the 'token' as the 'member'.
A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
     Full Idea: We cannot take a token of a word to be an occurrence of it. Suppose there is exactly one occurrence of the word 'etherized' in the whole of English poetry? Exactly one 'token'? This sort of occurrence is like the occurrence of a number in a sequence.
     From: Richard Cartwright (Propositions [1962], Add 2)
     A reaction: This remark is in an addendum to his paper, criticising his own lax use of the idea of 'token' in the actual paper. The example nicely shows that the type/token distinction isn't neat and tidy - though I consider it very useful.
Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn]
     Full Idea: Two things are said to be type-identical when they are similar enough to be declared qualitatively identical.
     From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)
     A reaction: A simple point which brings out the fact that type-identity is unlikely to be any sort of true identity (unless there is absolutely no different at all between two electrons, say).
Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn]
     Full Idea: A statement of so-called qualitative identity is really a statement of numerical identity (that is, identity tout court) about the properties of the objects in question - assuming that there are genuine universals.
     From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)
     A reaction: We might agree that two cars are type-identical, even though (under the microscope) we decided that none of their properties were absolutely identical.
Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn]
     Full Idea: We can analyse qualitative identity in terms of numerical identity, by saying that x and y are type-identical if there is a single type T that x and y both are, i.e. they both exemplify the same type.
     From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1)
     A reaction: This just seems to shift the problem onto the words 'are' and 'exemplify'. This takes us back to the problem of things 'partaking' of Plato's Forms. Better to say that qualitative identity isn't identity - it is resemblance (see Idea 6045).
It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn]
     Full Idea: It would be better to drop talk of 'numerical' and 'qualitative' identity altogether, speaking instead simply of identity and resemblance.
     From: Colin McGinn (Logical Properties [2000], Ch.1 n4)
     A reaction: This is the kind of beautifully simple proposal I pay analytical philosophers to come up with. I will attempt in future to talk either of 'identity' (which is strict), or 'resemblance' (which comes in degrees).
One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe]
     Full Idea: One venerable tradition, exemplified in Aquinas, has it that matter is the 'principle of individuation', that is, that all that can be guaranteed to distinguish two concrete thing of the same kind is the different matter of which they are composed.
     From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.5)
     A reaction: This seems to be 'identity-conditions' rather than 'individuation', according to Idea 7926. The problem would be how to identify that particular matter, apart from its composing that particular object. Replacing planks on a ship seems unimportant.
Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]
     Full Idea: Any individual thing must be a thing of some general kind - because, at the very least, it must belong to some ontological category.
     From: E.J. Lowe (Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence [2008], 2)
     A reaction: Where does the law that 'everything must have a category' come from? I'm baffled by remarks of this kind. Where do we get the categories from? From observing the individuals. So which has priority? Not the categories. Is God a kind?
Tokens are dated, concrete particulars; types are their general properties or kinds [Rowlands]
     Full Idea: Tokens are dated, concrete, particular occurrences or instances; types are the general properties that these occurrences exemplify or the kinds to which they belong.
     From: Mark Rowlands (Externalism [2003], Ch.2)
     A reaction: It might be said that types are sets, of which tokens are the members. The question of 'general properties' raises the question of whether universals must exist to make kinds possible.
'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl]
     Full Idea: If you found that I had the same car as you, I don't suppose you would care, but if you found I had the same fiancée as you, you might not be so happy.
     From: J Baggini / PS Fosl (The Philosopher's Toolkit [2003], §4.17)
     A reaction: A very nice illustration of the ambiguity of "same", and hence of identity. 'I had the same thought as you'. 'I have the same DNA as you'.