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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism

[mind is a causal oddity in a physical world]

13 ideas
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor]
If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical [Papineau]
There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan]
Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin]