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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect

[assessing effects against side effects of an act]

14 ideas
A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot]
     Full Idea: 'Double effect' refers to action having an effect aimed at, and also one foreseen but in now way desired. The 'doctrine' is that it is sometimes permissible to bring about by oblique intention what one may not directly intend.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.20)
     A reaction: Presumably this can only be justified by a trade-off. The unfortunate side effect must be rated as a price worth paying. If the side effect is not foreseen, that is presumably either understandable, or wickedly negligent. No clear rule is possible.
The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot]
     Full Idea: Supporters of double effect say that sometimes it makes a difference to the permissibility of an action involving harm to others that this harm, although foreseen, is not part of the agent's intention.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.22)
     A reaction: The obvious major case is the direction of wartime bombing raids. Controversial, because how can someone foresee a side effect and yet claim to have no intention to cause it? Isn't it wickedly self-deluding?
Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect offers us a way out [of the trolley problem], insisting that it is one thing to steer towards someone foreseeing that you will kill him, and another to aim at his death as part of your plan.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.23)
     A reaction: [She has just created her famous Trolley Problem]. Utilitarians must constantly rely on the doctrine of double effect, as they calculate their trade-offs.
Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot]
     Full Idea: The strength of the doctrine of double effect seems to lie in the distinction it makes between what we do (equated with direct intention) and what we allow (thought of as obliquely intended).
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25)
     A reaction: She objects (nicely), saying her trolley driver 'does' the side-effect killing, and someone might 'allow' an obvious criminal death. There is also an intermediate class of 'brought about', where you set up a killing, but don't do it.
Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot]
     Full Idea: Rejection of the doctrine of double effect puts us hopelessly in the power of bad men. Anyone who wants us to do something we think is wrong has only to threaten that otherwise he himself will do something we think worse.
     From: Philippa Foot (Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect [1967], p.25)
     A reaction: Her example is they will torture five if you don't torture one. Bernard Williams's famous Jim and the Indians is they will shoot twenty if you don't shoot one. Williams aims it at utilitarian calculations. Double effect is highly relevant.
We see a moral distinction between our aims and their foreseen consequences [Foot]
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a moral distinction between what we aim at and what we foresee as a result of what we do.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: Cf. Idea 22465. This seems to be the classic doctrine of double effect. It is hard to defend the claim that we are only responsible for what we aim at. A wide assessment of consequences is a moral duty. Well-meaning fools are bad.
We see a moral distinction between doing and allowing to happen [Foot]
     Full Idea: We have an intuition that there is a morally relevant distinction between what we do and what we allow to happen.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.88)
     A reaction: She says many deny this distinction, but she defends it. Presumably consequentialists deny the distinction. What is bad if I do it, but OK if I allow it to happen? Neglecting a victim to save others, she suggests.
Acts and omissions only matter if they concern doing something versus allowing it [Foot]
     Full Idea: The difference between acts and omissions is irrelevant to any moral issue except in so far as it corresponds to the distinction between allowing something to happen and being the agent to whom the happening can be ascribed.
     From: Philippa Foot (Morality, Action, and Outcome [1985], p.89)
     A reaction: The list of anyone's omissions is presumably infinite, but what they 'allow' must be in some way within their power. But what of something I can't now prevent, only because I failed to do some relevant task yesterday?
Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer]
     Full Idea: Double effect is defensible, I want to argue, only when the two outcomes are the product of a double intention - that 'good' be achieved, and that the foreseeable evil be reduced as far as possible.
     From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 09)
     A reaction: A good proposal, I think. We have to accept evil side effects sometimes, but it is immoral to pursue some good 'whatever the cost'.
Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect says (crudely) it is wrong to intentionally do a bad act for its good consequences, but it may be permissible to do a good act despite its foreseeable bad consequences. (..Shoot an innocent man to avoid his agonising death?)
     From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §6)
     A reaction: Glover rejects this principle, because he is a utilitarian. The principle implies a doubtful sharp distinction between an act and its consequences. If you foresee bad consequences, why do you go ahead and do it? I doubt if there are purely good acts.
Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect is that there is a moral distinction between what is foreseen by an agent as a likely result of an action, and what is intended.
     From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.150)
     A reaction: Abortion for a pregnancy threatening the mother's life. What always intrigues me is the effects which you didn't foresee because you couldn't be bothered to think about them. How much obligation do you have to try to foresee events?
Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner]
     Full Idea: It is suggested the double effect act requires 1) the act is good, 2) the bad effect is not intended, and is avoided if possible, 3) the bad effect doesn't cause the good result, 4) the good must outweigh the bad side effect.
     From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.151)
     A reaction: It is suggested that these won't work for permissibility of an action, but they might be appropriate for blameworthiness. Personally I am rather impressed by the four-part framework here, whatever nitpicking objections others may have found.
It is legitimate to do harm if it is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a good [Grayling]
     Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect says that it is legitimate to do harm if the harm is the unintended side-effect of an effort to achieve a legitimate goal.
     From: A.C. Grayling (Among the Dead Cities [2006], Ch.6)
     A reaction: I think a key principle of morality is our duty to think about possible unnoticed consequences of our actions. To neglect concern for side-effects is wicked. Beyond that, the issue must concern the particulars of the situation.
Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R]
     Full Idea: The real signficance of the doctrine of double effect can be public relations. You can put a better spin on an action by describing a death as an unfortunate collateral consequence, rather than as a goal of the action
     From: Rowland Stout (Action [2005], 7 'Doctrine')
     A reaction: The problem is that it the principle is usually invoked in situations where it is not clear where some bad effect is intended, and it is very easy to lie in such situations. In football, we can never quite decide whether a dangerous tackle was intended.