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2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor

['Do not multiply entities beyond necessity']

25 ideas
Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas]
Why use more things when fewer will do? [William of Ockham]
Do not multiply entities beyond necessity [William of Ockham]
Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles [Leibniz]
Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche]
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
If a sign is useless it is meaningless; that is the point of Ockham's maxim [Wittgenstein]
The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine]
In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine]
What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim]
Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum]
Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil]
Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil]
Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]
Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities [Mellor/Oliver]
It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe]
Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland]
If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin]
The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin]
We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J]
Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau]