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13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification

[general issues about external justification]

20 ideas
For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty]
     Full Idea: Locke didn't think of knowledge as true justified belief. …He considered "knowledge of" as prior to "knowledge that", and knowledge as a relation between persons and objects rather than persons and propositions.
     From: report of John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694]) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 3.2
     A reaction: This seems pretty close to Russell's 'knowledge by acquaintance'. You'd be a in a stronger position to build on this sort of thing if you were a direct realist about perception.
Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce]
     Full Idea: To satisfy our doubts it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency - by something upon which our thinking has no effect.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p.18)
     A reaction: This may be the single most important idea in pragmatism and in the philosophy of science. See Fodor on experiments (Idea 2455). Put the question to nature. The essential aim is to be passive in our beliefs - just let reality form them.
Externalism says knowledge involves a natural relation between the belief state and what makes it true [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: Externalist accounts of non-inferential knowledge say what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of knowledge is some natural relation which holds between the belief state and the situation which makes the belief true.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Belief Truth and Knowledge [1973], 11.III.6)
     A reaction: Armstrong's concept is presumably a response to Quine's desire to 'naturalise epistemology'. Bad move, I suspect. It probably reduces knowledge to mere true belief, and hence a redundant concept.
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
     Full Idea: For a long time people had a reason not to smoke cigarettes, without knowing that they had such a reason.
     From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.4)
     A reaction: What does 'had' a reason mean here? If I wish you dead, there is a reason why you should be dead, but you don't 'have' the reason, and never will have. There's probably a reason why I should never have been born.
Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
     Full Idea: Norm Externalism acknowledges that the content of our epistemic norms must be internalist, but employs external considerations in the selection of the norms themselves.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ep.Norms')
     A reaction: It can't be right that you just set your own norms, so this must contain some truth. Equally, even the most hardened externalist can't deny that what goes on in the head of the person concerned must have some relevance.
Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
     Full Idea: Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view in discussing epistemology.
     From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern')
     A reaction: Pollock's point, quite reasonably, is that the first-person aspect must precede any objective assessment of whether someone knows. External facts, such as unpublicised information, can undermine high quality internal justification.
Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
     Full Idea: An externalist theory of epistemic justification or warrant need not involve the possession by the believer of anything like a reason for thinking that their belief is true.
     From: Laurence Bonjour (In Defence of Pure Reason [1998], §3.7)
     A reaction: That is the problem with externalism. If the believer does not have a reason, then why would they believe? Externalists are interesting on justification, but daft about belief. Why do I believe I know something, when I can't recall how I learnt it?
Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour]
     Full Idea: The most extreme version of externalism would be one that held that the external condition required for justification is simply the truth of the belief in question.
     From: Laurence Bonjour (Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge [1980], §II)
     A reaction: The question is, why should we demand any more than this? The problem case is, traditionally, the lucky guess, but naturalist may say that these just don't occur with any regularity. We only get beliefs right because they are true.
Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J]
     Full Idea: One reading of the externalist approach may lead to a rejection of the belief condition for knowledge (in animals, perhaps).
     From: Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 9.3)
     A reaction: At this point the concept of 'knowledge' seems to disperse into the mist. This pushes me to a 'setting the bar high' view of knowledge. Otherwise plants will have it, and we don't want that.
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
     Full Idea: I call 'entitlement' (as opposed to justification) the epistemic rights or warrants that need not be understood by or even be accessible to the subject.
     From: Tyler Burge (Content Preservation [1993]), quoted by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered §III
     A reaction: I espouse a coherentism that has both internal and external components, and is mediated socially. In Burge's sense, animals will sometimes have 'entitlement'. I prefer, though, not to call this 'knowledge'. 'Entitled true belief' is good.
Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: From an externalist point of view, knowing about one's reliability is not required for 'first-order' knowledge.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: Ah. 'First-order knowledge' - what's that? What we used to call 'true belief', I would say. Adequate for animals, and a good guide to daily life, but uncritical and unjustifiable.
Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M]
     Full Idea: A problem with pure externalism is that it ignores the social dimension of knowledge.
     From: Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch. 2)
     A reaction: This seems to be contradicted by Idea 3573, which allows a social dimension to agreement over what is reliable. I am inclined to take knowledge as an entirely social concept.
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
     Full Idea: If someone consistently prophesied the winners of horse races, it appears that this man knows who will win the races, but surely he does not have justified beliefs as to who will win?
     From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.229)
     A reaction: This is where internalists and externalists (notably reliabilists) sharply part company. IF a reliable clairvoyant appeared, we would eventually accept them as a knower. But they DON'T appear, because knowledge needs justification!
Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane]
     Full Idea: It is controversial whether knowledge is a state of mind, or a composite state involving a thought about something, plus its existence.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 1.5)
     A reaction: Pinpoints the internalism/externalism problem. Knowledge is a special type of belief (but maybe belief with external links!). Tricky. I vote for internalism.
Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
     Full Idea: There are two major kinds of externalist theory in the literature - probabilism (which expresses justification in terms of probability of the belief being true), and reliabilism (which refers to the probability of the cognitive processes being right).
     From: J Pollock / J Cruz (Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd) [1999], §4.1)
     A reaction: A useful clarification. Reliabilism has an obvious problem, that a process can be reliable, but only luckily correct on this occasion (a clock which has, unusually, stopped). A ghost is more probably there if I believe in ghosts.
Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
     Full Idea: The concept of justification is absolutely central to epistemology; but this concept is normative (i.e. it lays down norms), so epistemology can't be reduced to factual cognitive psychology.
     From: Bernecker / Dretske (Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist [2000], Pt.III Int)
     A reaction: A simple rejection of the 'epistemology naturalised' idea. Best to start with slugs rather than people. You can confuse a slug, so it has truth or falsehood, but what is slug normativity? This is an interesting discussion point, not an argument.
Externalist accounts of knowledge do not require the traditional sort of justification [Kornblith]
     Full Idea: What is distinctive about externalist accounts of knowledge is that they do not require justification, at least in the traditional sense.
     From: Hilary Kornblith (Internalism and Externalism: a History [2001], p.2)
     A reaction: At least this gives animals the chance to know things, but I suspect that they never get beyond true beliefs. I'm sure humans have 'better' knowledge than animals.
Surely ALL truths are externally justified, by the facts? [Cross,A]
     Full Idea: Surely ALL truths are externally justified?
     From: Adam Cross (works [2001]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: A very nice warning to aspiring externalists. If you actually think the justification is somehow 'out there', then everything is going to be justified, by its own facts. We need to get the justification 'in here'.
Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins]
     Full Idea: I propose that knowledge is true belief which can be well explained .....just by citing the proposition believed.
     From: Carrie Jenkins (Grounding Concepts [2008], 3.1)
     A reaction: I don't find this appealing, and my reservation about Jenkins's book is her reliabilist, externalist epistemology. I would add an internalist coherentist epistemology to her very nice theory. 'I believe there are fairies at the bottom of my garden'?
Externalism may imply that identical mental states might go with different justifications [Vahid]
     Full Idea: According to the 'mentalist' version of internalism, an externalist is someone who maintains that two people can be in the same present mental states while one has a justified belief and the other does not.
     From: Hamid Vahid (Externalism/Internalism [2011], 2 A)
     A reaction: It seems an unlikely coincidence, that we have identical mental states, but your is (say) reliably created but mine isn't. Nevertheless this does seem to be an implication of externalism, though not a definition of it.