22109 | The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump] |
15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke] |
7070 | Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley] |
22058 | Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie] |
23029 | Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
23034 | The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature [Green,TH, by Muirhead] |
17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |
6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
9329 | Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer] |
8839 | Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P] |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
19513 | A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose] |
6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
10331 | Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch] |
10338 | The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch] |
4723 | Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady] |
6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
8843 | Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor] |
8844 | Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor] |
8618 | Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin] |