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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification

[proposal that coherent support creates knowledge]

29 ideas
The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke]
Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley]
Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie]
Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell]
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge [Lehrer]
Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J]
Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J]
For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J]
A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour]
There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour]
Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour]
A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares]
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs [Kusch]
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs [Kusch]
Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation [O'Grady]
For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin]
Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson]
Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson]
Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin]