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18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content

[how minds internally represent reality]

27 ideas
All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes]
The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell]
Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle]
Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so [Jackson]
Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry]
The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett]
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour]
Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor]
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images [Rey]
Animals map things over time as well as over space [Rey]
All thinking has content [Lyons]
You cannot determine the full content from a thought's intrinsic character, as relations are involved [Fine,K]
Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon]
The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
The content of a thought is just the meaning of a sentence [Rowlands]
Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]
The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati]
Two sentences with different meanings can, on occasion, have the same content [Magidor]
Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya]