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2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument

[reasoning and persuasion in general]

9 ideas
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Philosophical arguments are never incontrovertible - well, hardly ever. Their purpose is to help expound a position, not to coerce agreement.
     From: David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.419)
     A reaction: A bit over-cautious, perhaps. Most philosophers are converted to a position when they hear a single key argument, though it is probably 'tipping the balance' of previous discussions.
Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski]
     Full Idea: Objection by counterexample is the weakest sort of attack a theory can undergo. Even when the objection succeeds, it shows only that a theory fails to achieve complete accuracy. It does not distinguish among the various rival theories.
     From: Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (Virtues of the Mind [1996], III 2.1)
     A reaction: Typically counterexamples are used to refute universal generalisations (i.e. by 'falsification'), but canny theorists avoid those, or slip in a qualifying clause. Counterexamples are good for exploring a theory's coverage.
Valid arguments can be rejected by challenging the premises or presuppositions [Martin,M]
     Full Idea: Putting forward a valid argument isn't necessarily going to succeed in getting someone to see things your way, because if they don't accept the conclusion, they ask which premises they should reject, or whether an illegitimate assumption is being made.
     From: Michael Martin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.136)
     A reaction: Valid arguments are still vital. It is just that good philosophers realise the problem noted here, and spend huge stretches of discussion on establishing acceptance of premises, and showing that there are no dodgy presuppositions.
Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
     Full Idea: There is a seasoned method of turning your opponent's modus ponens into your own modus tollens.
     From: Trenton Merricks (Propositions [2015], 5.VII)
     A reaction: That is, they say 'if he's coming he'll be hear by now, and he's definitely coming', to which you say 'I'm afraid he's not here, so he obviously isn't coming after all'. They say if-A-then-B, and A, so B. You say not-B, so you're wrong about A.
My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
     Full Idea: One philosopher's modus ponens is another philosopher's modus tollens.
     From: Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological Disjunctivism [2012], 3.§2)
     A reaction: [Anyone know the originator of this nice thought?] You say A is true, and A proves B, so B is true. I reply that if A proves something as daft as B, then so much the worse for A. Ain't it the truth?
Promoting an ontology by its implied good metaphysic is an 'argument-by-display' [Williams,NE]
     Full Idea: The form of argument which sells an ontology on the basis a metaphysic is known as an 'argument-by-display'.
     From: Neil E. Williams (The Powers Metaphysics [2019], 01.2)
     A reaction: [Attributed to John Bigelow 1999] New to me, but I'm quite a fan of this. For example, my rejection of platonism is not based on specific arguments, but on looking at the whole platonic picture of reality.
You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli]
     Full Idea: A 'rebut' of an argument establishes that its conclusion is not the case. An 'undercut' of the argument shows that the premises do not support that conclusion.
     From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 3.2)
A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
     Full Idea: In a 'teepee' argument, a number of argumentative planks intersupport each other. No plank is sufficiently strong to establish the position, but each lends credibility to the others because there is the appearance of a unified phenomenon.
     From: Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh (The Inessential Indexical [2013], 01.5)
     A reaction: To attack it, they say, you have to identify the separate planks of the argument. It is a moot point whether the teepee might be so imprecise that it is better described as 'coherence'. There is a background support, as well as the planks.
Slippery slope arguments are challenges to show where a non-arbitrary boundary lies [Vetter]
     Full Idea: Slippery slope arguments are not intended as demonstrative arguments, but rather as a challenge to show where a boundary is, and to show that the boundary is not arbitrary.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 5.3.3)
     A reaction: [extracted from details of its context] You could respond by saying that a slippery slope levels off, rather than hitting a wall or plunging to perdition.