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17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies

[possible complete human, but lacking awareness]

11 ideas
It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: If it could be supposed that a body exists without a mind, then a man would do everything in the same way as if he did not have a mind, and men would speak and write the same things, without knowing what they do. ...But this supposition is impossible.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Paper of December 1676 [1676], A6.3.400), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 5
     A reaction: This is clearly the zombie dream, three centuries before Robert Kirk's modern invention of the idea. Leibniz's reason for denying the possibility of zombies won't be the modern physicalist reason.
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
     Full Idea: The identity theorist has to hold that we are under some illusion in thinking that we can imagine that there could have been pains without brain states.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Identity and Necessity [1971], p.190)
     A reaction: The origin of Robert Kirk's idea that there might be zombies. Kripke is wrong. Of course Kripke and his friends can imagine disembodied pains; the question is whether being able to imagine them makes them possible, which it doesn't.
It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke]
     Full Idea: Prima facie, it would seem that it is a least logically possible the brain state corresponding to pain should have existed (Jones's brain could have been in exactly that state at the time in question) without Jones feeling any pain at all.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 3)
     A reaction: This is Kripke's commitment to the possibility of zombies, which are only possible if the mind-body connection is a contingent one, and he shows that there are no contingent 'identities'. The answer is necessary identity, and no zombies.
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
     Full Idea: There could be no intentional zombie, because (unlike with a conscious agent) there simply is no fact of the matter as to exactly which aspectual shapes its alleged intentional states have. Is it seeking water or H2O?
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 7.III)
     A reaction: The obvious response to this is behaviourist talk of 'dispositions'. The dispositions of scientist when seeking water and when seeking H2O are different. Zombies behave identically to us, so their intentional states have whatever is needed to do the job.
Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The goal of an objective phenomenology would be to describe, at least in part, the subjective character of experiences in a form comprehensible to beings incapable of having those experiences.
     From: Thomas Nagel (What is it like to be a bat? [1974], p.179)
     A reaction: This seems a bizarre expectation. We can already explain visual experience to the blind up to a point, but no one is dreaming of an "objective phenomenology" which will give blind people total understanding, just by reading about it in braille.
Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers doubt the coherence of the very idea of inverted or absent qualia.
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.115)
     A reaction: The possibility of inverted qualia with identical brain structures strikes me as nil, but it would be odd to deny that qualia could be changed by brain surgery, given that insects can see ultra-violet, and some people are colourblind.
What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
     Full Idea: Is there anything about the qualitative characters of mental states which, should we come to know it, would convince us that zombies and qualia inversion are not really possible?
     From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.171)
     A reaction: The issue is what causes the qualitative states, not their 'characters'. This strikes me as falling into the trap of thinking that 'what it is like to be..' is a crucial issue. I think zombies are impossible, but not because I experience redness.
If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers]
     Full Idea: The explanation of my zombie twin's claims does not depend on consciousness, as there is none in his world. It follows that the explanation of my claims is also independent of the existence of consciousness.
     From: David J.Chalmers (The Conscious Mind [1996], 2.5.2)
     A reaction: Epiphenomenalism says my accounts of my consciousness are NOT because of my consciousness (which seems daft). Chalmers here gives a very good reason why we should not be a friend of philosophical zombies.
Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil]
     Full Idea: Philosophers' zombies (invented by Robert Kirk) differ from the zombies of folklore; they are intended to make clear the idea that consciousness is an addition of being, something 'over and above' the physical world.
     From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 20.1 n1)
     A reaction: The famous defender of zombies is David Chalmers. You can't believe in zombies if you believe (as I do) that 'the physical entails the mental'. Could there be redness without something that is red? If consciousness is extra, what is conscious?
Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil]
     Full Idea: The possibility of zombies is founded on the idea that consciousness is related contingently to physical states and processes.
     From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 20.3)
     A reaction: The question is, how do you decide whether the relationship is contingent or necessary? Hence the interest in whether conceivability entails possibility. Kripke attacks the idea of contingent identity, pointing towards necessity, and away from zombies.
Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil]
     Full Idea: Functionalists deny that zombies are possible since states of mind (including conscious states) are purely functional states. If two agents are in the same functional state, regardless of qualitative difference, they are in the same mental state.
     From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 20.5)
     A reaction: In its 'brief' form this idea begins to smell of tautology. Only the right sort of functional state would entail a mental state, and how else can that functional state be defined, apart from its leading to a mental state?