12727 | It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind [Leibniz] |
9177 | Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke] |
4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
3390 | Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim] |
3414 | What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim] |
2413 | If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness [Chalmers] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |