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22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics

[objections to social codes of morality]

8 ideas
All men prefer outward appearance to true excellence [Kongzi (Confucius)]
     Full Idea: I have yet to meet a man as fond of excellence as he is of outward appearances.
     From: Kongzi (Confucius) (The Analects (Lunyu) [c.511 BCE], IX.18)
     A reaction: Interestingly, this cynical view of the love of virtue is put by Plato into the mouths of Glaucon and Adeimantus (in Bk II of 'Republic', e.g. Idea 12), and not into the mouth of Socrates, who goes on to defend the possibility of true virtue.
Good and evil are the same thing [Heraclitus, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Heraclitus said that good and evil are the same thing.
     From: report of Heraclitus (fragments/reports [c.500 BCE], 58/102) by Aristotle - Topics 159b32
     A reaction: Heaven knows what he meant by this, though it sounds suspiciously like moral nihilism. Maybe Heraclitus was not a very nice man. Or is the thought a more sophisticated one, in line with Nietzsche's remarks about cultural morality?
Only the Cyrenaics reject the idea of a final moral end [Aristippus elder, by Annas]
     Full Idea: The Cyrenaics are the most radical ancient moral philosophers, since they are the only school explicitly to reject the importance of achieving an overall final end.
     From: report of Aristippus the elder (fragments/reports [c.395 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 11.1
There is no universal goal to human life [Aenesidemus, by Photius]
     Full Idea: Aenesidemus does not allow either happiness or pleasure or prudence or any other goal held by anyone on the basis of philosophical doctrine as the goal of life; rather, he says that there just is no such thing as a goal which is recognised by all people.
     From: report of Aenesidemus (Pyrrhonian Arguments (frags) [c.60 BCE], Bk 8) by 'Photius Bibliotheca' - Aenesidimus (frags) 170b
     A reaction: This is probably the dominant modern (post-Darwinian, existentialist) view. Personally I am sympathetic to the Aristotelian view that (to some extent) appropriate goals for life can be inferred from a fairly stable human nature.
Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Morality acts to prevent the rise of new and better mores: it stupefies.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Dawn (Daybreak) [1881], 019)
     A reaction: Note that he wants 'better' customs, and not just different ones. So the deep question concerns the criteria for why some customs are better. He seems to want us to fulfil our natures more completely. Arts, sciences, great deeds...
We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: We need a critique of moral values; the value of these values themselves must just be called in question.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], Pre f§3)
     A reaction: But we must start somewhere with values, to avoid an infinite regress.
'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
     Full Idea: The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications.
     From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1)
     A reaction: [Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'.
A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
     Full Idea: Amoralists make moral judgements without being motivated accordingly, and without suffering any sort of practical irrationality either; the practicality requirement of moral judgement is thus false.
     From: Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.3)
     A reaction: It is hard to imagine an immoralist with this nihilistic attitude bothering to make any moral judgements at all. Why would someone indifferent to art make aesthetic judgements? What could a 'judgement of rightness' mean to an amoralist?