structure for 'Thought'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     expand these ideas

18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content

[meanings aren't in the head ('Externalism')]

39 ideas
The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz]
The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz]
We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell]
Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Heil on Wittgenstein]
Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein]
I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam]
'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam]
Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Rowlands on Davidson]
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker]
How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker]
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs. [Lewis]
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau]
If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau]
Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari]
Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey]
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane]
Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil]
Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions [Edelman/Tononi]
Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale]