8511 | Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K] |
8508 | A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC] |
8509 | A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC] |
8510 | 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC] |
15483 | Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB] |
8537 | Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong] |
18373 | If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong] |
4444 | One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong] |
9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
8513 | Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K] |
8514 | Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K] |
8522 | Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K] |
8523 | Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K] |
8524 | Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K] |
11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
8526 | We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly] |
10739 | The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver] |
10738 | Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver] |
10741 | Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver] |
10740 | The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver] |
7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
10464 | A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John] |
10465 | Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John] |
10467 | Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John] |
8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
14605 | Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J] |
7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |