structure for 'Modes of Existence'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     expand these ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

[the principles and concepts of trope theory]

36 ideas
Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Campbell,K on Stout,GF]
A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly]
The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil]
A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John]
Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John]
Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John]
I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe]
Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Edwards on Simons]
Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald]
Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald]
Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald]
The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant]