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13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique

[criticisms of existence of foundational beliefs]

19 ideas
It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)]
There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume]
A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant]
If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo [Boolos on Neurath]
We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock [Neurath]
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim]
If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]