5267 | Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle] |
20042 | We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle] |
21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |
19615 | I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran] |
23436 | It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
9284 | Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B] |
3871 | Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith] |
20064 | Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R] |
6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
19519 | Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman] |
20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |