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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism

[universals are classes of things]

16 ideas
You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Devitt on Quine]
Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Macdonald on Quine]
In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]
Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil]
If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]