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8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

[universals are groups of resembling particulars]

22 ideas
A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine]
If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume]
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson]
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil]
Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil]
Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]