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3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique

[criticism of the correspondence theory of truth]

25 ideas
There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege]
In many cases there is no obvious way in which ideas can agree with their object [James]
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map [Austin,JL]
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
The correspondence theory is wrong, because there is no one correspondence between reality and fact [O'Grady on Putnam]
Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]
There is nothng interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack]
Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M]
'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn]
The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn]
If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood]
One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe]
Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
If the correspondence theory is right, then necessary truths must correspond to something [Merricks]
Being true is not a relation, it is a primitive monadic property [Merricks]
The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]
Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Halbach]