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17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism

[mental states are defined in entirely causal terms]

7 ideas
If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
     Full Idea: Armstrong and Lewis said that mental items were defined in terms of typical causes and effects; if, as seems likely, research reveals that a particular causal niche is occupied by a physical state, it follows that pain is a physical state.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.5
     A reaction: I am not fully convinced of the first step in the argument. It sounds like the epistemology and the ontology have got muddled (as usual). We define mental states as we define electrons, in terms of observed behaviour, but what are they?
Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
     Full Idea: The Armstrong/Lewis version of functionalism takes mental properties to be functional properties, but identifies these with what other functionalists would regard as their realisers.
     From: report of David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968]) by John Heil - Philosophy of Mind Ch.4
     A reaction: Heil rejects this, but I am beginning to think that this is the answer. If functions do not have an ontological life of their own (the 'ringing' of the bell), then functionalist mental states can't either. Function is not an ontological category.
Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: I speak of my view as the Causal version of functionalism, which asserts that mental states are states apt for the production of certain ranges of behaviour and, in some cases, apt for being produced by certain ranges of stimuli.
     From: David M. Armstrong (Pref to new 'Materialist Theory' [1992], p.xiv)
     A reaction: This effectively makes a mental state a place in a flowdiagram (and hence the mind is software). It says nothing about what qualities the mental states have which make them apt for this role. Full explanations need more than the function.
Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The definitive characteristic of any experience is its causal role, its most typical causes and effects; but we materialists believe that these causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states.
     From: David Lewis (An Argument for the Identity Theory [1966], §I)
     A reaction: This is the Causal version of functionalism, which Armstrong also developed. The word 'typical' leads later to a teleological element in the theory (e.g. in Lycan). There are other things to say about mental states than just their causal role.
'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis]
     Full Idea: On my theory, 'pain' is a contingent name - that is, a name with different denotations in different possible worlds - since in any world, 'pain' names whatever state happens in that world to occupy the causal role definitive of pain.
     From: David Lewis (An Argument for the Identity Theory [1966], §II n6)
     A reaction: Better to say that 'pain' (like 'sound') is ambiguous. It is indiscriminately used by English-speakers to mean [1] the raw quale that we experience when damaged, and [2] whatever it is that leads to pain behaviour. Maybe frogs have 2 but not 1.
Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis]
     Full Idea: The materialist theory Armstrong and I proposed joins claims of type-type psychophysical identity with a behaviourist or functionalist way of characterising mental states such as pain.
     From: David Lewis (Mad Pain and Martian Pain [1980], §III)
     A reaction: Armstrong has backed off from 'type-type' identity, because the realisations of a given mental state might be too diverse to be considered of the same type. Putnam's machine functionalism allows the possibility of dualism.
Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor]
     Full Idea: Everybody is a functionalist, in that we all hold that mental states are individuated, at least in part, by reference to their causal powers.
     From: Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p.138)
     A reaction: I might individuate the Prime Minister by the carnation in his buttonhole. However, even a dualist must concede that we individuate mental faculties by their role within the mind.