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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good

[distinguishing what is good from right action]

12 ideas
Hobbes shifted from talk of 'the good' to talk of 'rights' [Hobbes, by Tuck]
     Full Idea: Hobbes (like Grotius) shifted from talking about 'the good', which had been the traditional subject for both ancient and Renaissance moralists, to talking instead about 'rights'.
     From: report of Thomas Hobbes (The Elements of Law [1640]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.2
     A reaction: This is part of the crucial shift away from the Greek interest in excellence of character, towards the Enlightenment legalistic interest in right actions, as well as social rights. Bad move, well analysed by MacIntyre.
Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
     Full Idea: Bentham has not made up his mind whether he thinks that 'right' means 'productive of the general happiness', or that being productive of the general happiness is what makes acts right (and he would have thought the difference unimportant).
     From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §I
     A reaction: The issue is whether rightness exists as a concept separate from happiness. I take it Bentham would vote for the first reading, as he has no interest in what is right, apart from increasing happiness.
Morality originally judged people, and actions only later on [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Designation of moral values was everywhere first applied to human beings, and only later and derivatively to actions.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §260)
     A reaction: Nietzsche was a great expert on ethics in the ancient world, so you should trust him on this one. In ordinary life assessment of people is what counts. Actions are for law courts.
For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross]
     Full Idea: Moore claims that 'right' means 'productive of the greatest possible good'.
     From: report of G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica [1903]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §I
     A reaction: Ross is at pains to keep 'right' and 'good' as quite distinct notions. Some actions are right but very unpleasant, and seem to produce no real good at all.
'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE]
     Full Idea: 'Right' does and can mean nothing but 'cause of a good result', and is thus identical with 'useful', whence it follows that the end always will justify the means.
     From: G.E. Moore (Principia Ethica [1903], §089)
     A reaction: Of course, Moore does not identify utility with pleasure, as his notion of what is good concerns fairly Platonic ideals. Would Stalin's murders have been right if Russia were now the happiest nation on Earth?
'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
     Full Idea: 'Right' does not mean the same as 'morally good'; we cannot substitute 'he is a right man' for 'he is a morally good man'; this is not just an English idiom, as it is clear that a 'right act' is the act which ought to be done.
     From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I)
     A reaction: This is nowadays accepted as a basic distinction in ethical discussions. Shooting a prisoner might be the right thing to do, but it is unlikely to be good. We may talk of 'good deeds', but never of 'right' people.
If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
     Full Idea: If it is our duty to produce one or other of two or more different states of affairs, without its being our duty to produce one rather than the another, then in such a case each of these acts will be right, and none will be our duty.
     From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I)
     A reaction: An elegant piece of analytical philosophy, which shows fairly conclusively that 'right' is distinct from 'duty', as well as being distinct from 'good'. We can generalise about right actions, without identifying anyone who has the duty to perform them.
In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
     Full Idea: In the past 'what is right' was hardly disentangled from 'what the tribe ordains'; ..'it is the custom' has been accompanied by 'the custom is right', or 'the custom is ordained by someone who has the right to command'.
     From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §I)
     A reaction: Ross is rejecting this older view, in favour an absolute (and intuitively known) concept of what is right. All right-thinking people should wish Ross luck in his project, no matter how pessimistic the onlooker may be.
Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
     Full Idea: Goodness in general runs out beyond the strict scope of ethics, if ethics be the philosophical study of good conduct; for some things that are good are neither conduct nor dispositions to conduct.
     From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §IV)
     A reaction: This seems to be right, just as the Greek term 'areté' extended beyond moral virtue to excellence in athletics or pottery. Maybe philosophers are too interested in ethics, and have thus missed the philosophical core of the problem.
Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
     Full Idea: Actions are morally good in virtue of their motives; this is quite distinct from rightness, which belongs to act in virtue of the nature of what is done. So a good action may not do what is right, and a right action need not be morally good.
     From: W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §VII)
     A reaction: This sounds neat, but it is hard to find clearcut examples to confirm it. Having your cat put down may be right but not good, but presumably your motive was good.
Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson]
     Full Idea: Rawls defends the thesis of the priority of the right over the good.
     From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.7:100
     A reaction: It depends whether you are talking about actions, or about states of affairs. I don't see how any state of affairs can be preferred to the good one. It may be that the highest duty of action is to do what is right, rather than to achieve what is good.
Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Teleological theories take concern for the good (e.g. freedom or utility) as fundamental, and concern for people as derivative.
     From: Will Kymlicka (Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) [1990], 2.4.a.ii)
     A reaction: There's a nice fundamental question with which to begin a discussion of value: which matters most - abstract values, or individual people? Placing a collective of people first (Stalinism?) seems to fall between them.