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22. Metaethics / A. Ethical Ends / 1. Value / a. Nature of value

[what is desirability or worth in something?]

19 ideas
For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
Values don't accumulate; they are ruthlessly replaced [Cioran]
The word 'inconsiderate' nicely shows the blurring of facts and values [Putnam]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Orsi on Dancy,J]
Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes]
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]