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22. Metaethics / A. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value

[what is desirability or worth in something?]

20 ideas
For Aristotle 'good' means purpose, and value is real but relational [Achtenberg on Aristotle]
Prime values apply to the life in agreement; useful values apply to the natural life [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant]
Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre]
Values don't accumulate; they are ruthlessly replaced [Cioran]
The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi]
There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes]
We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes]
Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes]
Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes]
The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes]
Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]